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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Problem of the Thesis 
The problem of this thesis will be: first ,to establish the 
meaning which Hegel gives to the word 'property'; second, to 
trace the movement of property from abstract right through 
morality to the ethical life, and to decide what role property 
plays in each phase of this movement. We will also be inter-
es~ed in the connection between property and capital which is 
£ound in the section on the ethical life. 
This study will limit itself to the social implications of 
property {the different role which property plays in such 
social institutions as the family, civil society, and the 
state) and the philosophical justi£ication for private property. 
It will not, except where related to these two aspects, deal 
' 
with the legal_or economic questions concerning property, nor 
will this study treat in any detail Hegel's metaphysics, his 
epistemology, or his philosophy of religion. 
Some Source Books Used 
The primary source used in this study is Hegel's Philoso-
phy of Right as translated by T. M. Knox. However, we have 
found that an adequate account of Hegel's notion of property 
demands that this work be supplemented by others. Thus, we 
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have found occasion to refer to ~he J. B. Baillie's transla-
tion of The Phenomenology of Mind, to G. E. Mueller's transla-
tion of The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and to J. Sibree 1 s 
translation of The Philosophy of History. We have also found 
parts of the Jenenser Realphilosophie to be an important sup-
plement to the notion of property found in the Philosophy of 
Right. For this we have used an unpublished translation by 
Professor Marx Wartofsky. Secondary material has been quoted 
infrequently, but we have found Herbert Marcuse 1 s Reason and 
Revolution: Hegel and The Rise of Social Theory most useful. 
Our references to Marx have been based primarily on selections 
edited by such people as Erich Fromm, Sidney Hook, and Lewis 
Feuer. 
Methodology of the Thesis 
The method used in this thesis will be to start off with a 
fairly det~iled account of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. In 
Chapter II, we begin our inquiry with an examination of ab-
stract right. Here, we consider the meaning of 'property' an~ 
its relation to possession and contract. In Chapter III, we 
consider morality and its relation to abstract right. Chapter 
IV is an examination of the actual standards which are found 
objectified in the institutions of the ethical life, institu-
tions such as the family, civil society and the state and the 
relationship between property and capital. While in Chapters 
II, III and IV we are concerned mainly with exposition and in-
terpretation of Hegel's political philosophy and of his ideas 
• 
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of property, in Chapter V, we compare these concepts of Hegel's 
to _similar concepts of Marx trying to discover their essential 
similarities and differences. In Chapter VI, we take a more 
critical approach, trying to decide whether Hegel's justifica-
tion of private property has been adequate • 
• CHAPTER II 
ABSTRACT RIGHT AND PROPERTY 
Hegel initiates his discussipn of the state by an analysis 
of abstract right which, Hegel says, refers to those rights 
which exist outside of the state. 
In the sphere of abstract right, we are concerned only 
with the person as person, and therefore with the particu-
lar ••• only in so far as it is something separable from 
the person and immediately different from him.l 
Here, we are interested in the person as an abstract person-
ality and not as a member of a larger unit. We are not in-
terested in him as a father, as a business man, or as a 
citizen; we are interested in him only as a person. At this 
point, Hegel is somewhat in affinity with Locke, for Locke 
also begins his analysis with the individual in separation 
from the social units with which he is usually associated. 
Locke begins with man, not with man as a member of a p~liti­
cal unit. "To understand political power right and derive it 
from its original, we must consider what state all men are 
naturally in. 112 It is revealing to note that whereas Locke 
calls this state of man 'natural', Hegel calls it 'abstract' 
for where Locke is going to derive the political from the 
natural, Hegel is going to complete the abstract with the con-
crete, or the person with the political unit. Hegel and Locke 
1. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, 
trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1958), p. 41. 
2. Locke, John, The Second Treatise of Government (New York: 
The Liberal Arts Press, 1952), p. 4. 
-4-
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begin at the same point, and the different emphasis which they 
place on this point does determine the divergent directions in 
which they are to go. But let it not be thought that immedi-
ately after agreeing on the starting post, they cannot agree 
on which gate to exit. For only after lingering awhile and 
comparing notes do they decide to go their separate ways. The 
post itself looks the same whether one be facing the stables 
or the track. For where Locke finds that man has a right to 
1 
anything with which "he has mixed his labor," so Hegel finds 
that "A person has as his substantive end the right of putting 
his will into any and·everything and thereby making it his, be-
cause it has no such end in itself and derives its destiny and 
soul from his will. This is the absolute right of appropria-
tion which man has over all 'things 1 ". 2 Furthermore, both 
Hegel and Locke find that this initial right needs something 
stronger than the individual to preserve it. Locke calls that 
unit which protects the right of property, 'the state'; Hegel 
calls it 'civil society.' 
For Hegel, property does more than satisfy the appetites 
and desires of the individual; it determines this individual. 
The thing sets itself up as something which the individual is 
not.; it is different than the individual. Before the individual 
puts his will into the thing, he is governed by his immediate 
will, by a will which knows no restrictions and is directed by 
nothing but its own immediate desires. In this early stage of 
1. Ibid. , p. 17. 
2. Hegel, The Philosophy' of Right, p. 41. 
• 
the will 
The whole of this content, as we light upon it 
in its immediacy in the will, is there only as a 
medley and multiplicity of impulses, each of which 
is merely 'my desire' but exists alongside other 
desires which are likewise all 'mine', and each of 
which is at the same time something universal and 
indeterminate, aimed at all kinds of objects and 
satiable in all kinds of ways. When, in this two-
fold indeterminacy, the will gives itself the form 
of individuality ••• this constitutes the resulution 
of the will, and it is only in so far as it resolves 
that the will is an actual will at all.l 
6 
The will becomes an individual by placing itself in a particu-
lar object. The will chooses to determine itself in a certain 
direction. In this way, the individual is restricted, but he 
is self-restricted; he is determined, but he is self-determined; 
he exhibits a universality, but it is a universality which is 
tied up with a particular object. The universal and indeter-
minate desires of which Hegel speaks, are potentially capable 
of being satisfied in an infinite number of ways, but this re-
mains only potential until the individual chooses a particular 
method of satisfaction. Only when the individual places his 
will in an object does satisfaction become more than potential, 
only then does it become real satisfaction. Because the ob-
ject which completes the satisfaction is only one among many 
objects which could conceivably perform the same task, the in-
dividual is not completely bound by the object; he may, if he 
chooses, seek another means of satisfaction. As Hegel writes: 
The ego determines itself in so far as it is the relating 
of negativity to itself. As this self-relation, it is 
1. ~., p. 26. 
.. 
indifferent to this determinacy; it knows it as something 
which is its own, something which is only ideal, a mere 
possibility by which it is not constrained and in which 
it is confined only because it has put itself in it.--
This is the freedom of the will and it constitutes the 
concept or substantiality of the will.l 
7 ' 
The will, if it is to realize the concept, must determine 
itself in this way, for as Hegel "'Y"rites: 
The contradiction which the arbitrary will is ••• 
comes into appearance as a dialectic of impulses and 
inclinations; each of them in the way of every other --
the satisfaction of one is unavoidably subordinated or 
sacrificed to the satisfaction of another, and so on. 
An impulse is simply a uni-directional urge and thus 
has no measuring-rod in itself.2 
In this situation, where impulse and reflection stand apart 
from one another and where impulse is the ruling force, the 
individual must either move in many and diverse directions, 
while sacrificing the fulfillment of any one, or he must 
choose to follow one impulse and thus destroy his universality. 
"If I neglect all the others and put myself in one of them by 
itself, I find myself under a restriction which destroys me, 
since by so doing I have surrendered my universality, which is 
the system of all impulses. 113 Yet, neither is there any sense 
in making a hierarchy of impulses since at this moment, there 
is no criterion for ordering them. 4 However, we have seen 
1. llli·' p. 23. 
2. Ibid., p. 28. 
-
3. Ibid., p. 231. 
4. 
.!El:!·' p. 231 • 
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that a person has a right to place his will into anything 
ttand th b k •t h. ul ere y rna e 1 1s. By placing his will in a thing, a 
2 person "translates his freedom into an external sphere," and 
he becomes an object to himself. Only by involving himself in 
an external thing which is different from himself is the in-
I 
dividual able to discover what he really is. Only by placing 
his will into something which is "not free, not personal, 
without right" 3 does the individual discover that he is free, 
that he· is a person that he has rights. 
The process of becoming an object for oneself demands more 
than the fleeting interest in ~n object which the satisfaction 
of a need requires. The interest must be the kind which al-
lows us to see the object as different from ourselves and, in 
so far as we understand that the object is different, so do we 
have an understanding of what we ourselves are. This is the 
difference between possession and property. 
To have power over a thing ab extra constitutes 
possession. The particular aspect of the matter, the 
fact that I make something my own as a result of my 
natural need, impulse and caprice, is the particular 
interest satisfied by possession. But I as a free will 
am an object to myself in what I possess and thereby 
also for the first time am an actual will, and this is 
the aspect which constitutes the category of property, 
1. ~., p. 41. 
2. ~., P• 40. 
3. Hegel's Philosophy of Right, p. 40. 
• 
• 
the true and right factor in possession. 1 
The will which places itself in the object is the will of a 
single individual and thus, the form which this object takes 
is the form of private property. By placing his will in the 
9 
object, the individual is demanding that others recognize this 
object as his and until this recognition takes place, the prop-
erty relation is not complete. 
Now it is the relation between the individual and the ob-
.ject which determines his actions both towards the object and 
towards other human beings with whom he comes into.relation. 
No longer is the direction taken by the person dictated by 
those fleeting impulses which previously reigned supreme; now 
his relation with the object governs his activity. Through 
this relationship, the ego has come to recognize something as 
its own and, at the same time, it has come to recognize itself. 
But the process does not end here for, "A person by distin-
guishing himself from himself relates himself to another 
person, and it is only as owners that these two persons really 
exist for each other. 112 It is through things that the demands 
of one person are felt by another, a demand which says: "You 
shall recognize this as mine; you shall recognize my right to 
property and my rights as a person." For rights exist only 
over things. .As we have noted previously: nwhat is immediately 
different from free mind is that which both for mind and in 
1.¥ Ibid. , p. 42. 
2. ~., P• 38. 
,. 
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itselftn~ external pure and simple, a thing, something not 
free, not personal, without rights."1 To be a thing means to 
be an object for a person, to be a person means to be an object 
for one's self. In so far as a man is a slave, he is a thing, 
but even in slavery there are some elements of freedom which 
serve to show that no man is ever completely a slave. In so 
far as he is a man, his essence is freedom, and no one has the 
right to make him a slave. At this point, it seems that Hegel 
intends the concept of right to embrace the concept of power, 
for the argument seems to be pointing to the fact that no man 
has the power to fully subject another to his will without him-
self becoming dependent upon the will which he has subjected. 
Man has potential fr'eedom, he has the sap.aci ty to function and 
to act for himself. Man exists, first of all, to serve himself 
while an object exists to serve man. 
Man, pursuant to his immediate existence within 
himself, is something natural, external to his 
comcept. It is only through the development of his 
own body·and mind, essentially through his self-, 
consciousness's apprehension of itself as free, •that 
he takes possession of himself and becomes his 'own 
property and no one else~s. This taki.~g possession 
of oneself, looked at from the opposite point of 
view, is the translation into actuality of what one 
is according to one's concept, i.e. a potentiality, 
capacity, potency.a 
Now if the mind sees itself as a potential, it also believes 
that it should realize this potential. It believes that it 
1 • .!ill·' p. 40. 
2. ~·, pp. 47-48. 
' 
should be in actuality what it is potentially. As Hegel 
explains: 
The fact that what mind is according to the concept 
or implicitly it should also be explicitly and exis-
tentially (the fact that thus mind should be a person, 
be capable of holding property, should have ~n ethical 
life, a religion! is the idea which is itself the 
concept of mind. 
The institution of slavery depends upon regarding man as 
11 a natural entity pure and simple, as an existent not in con-
formity with the concept. The argument for the absolute 
11 
injustice of slavery, on the other hand,, adheres to the con-
cept of man as mind, as something inherently free. 112 The slave 
society has always looked upon the slave as he immediately is, 
as something without potential, as something divorced from 
process, as something not free. For Hegel, all men are im-
plicitly free and the objective of society is to make mind's 
existence "solely its own and free. 113 However, this has not 
always been the way the problem has been stated. Often the 
advocate~ of slavery contend that a being is a man only if he 
is free. A slave is something less than a man. They might 
argue that we do not first recognize that an individual is a 
man and then admit that freedom is essential to manhood, rather 
we find out whether a being is a man by discovering whether or 
not he is free. These societies which permitted slavery and 
1. ~., p. 53. 
2. ~., p. 49: 
3. ~-' p. 48. 
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those philosophies which justified it were not always so will-
ing to admit that a slave was a man in the same sense, and 
with the same capacities as they, themselves, were men. Hegel 
contends that all men have the capacity to be free and with 
this, the slave's master might agree. But, when it came to a 
crucial test, a test which would decide whether this dark 
skinned Homo-sapiens was to work for himself, or for another, 
then the master and the philosopher part company. For Hegel is 
not primarily interested in linguistic gymnastics and in the 
Phenomenology of Mind he attempts to show that no man can 
ever completely be a slave to another. Here Hegel examines 
the case of absolute slavery, a society in which one man exists 
totally for the sake of another. The slave is seen by the 
master as nothing more than a thing. Initially, the master 
has some awareness of his self-consciousness, while the slave 
is not aware of his. The master is able to control the slave 
and to assert himself at the slave's expense. 11Stillu, Hegel 
writes, "even this distinction rests ultimately on their ••• 
essential identity."1 Yet what Hegel really wants to show in 
this analysis is that nthe individual can become what he is 
only through another individua1." 2 The initial stages of this 
1. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie 
(New York: The Macmillan Co. 1955), p. 230. 
2. Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: He el and the Rise 
of Social Theory Boston: Beacon Press, 1960 , p. 114. 
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relationship are manifested in a life and death struggle be-
tween the two selves. "li!ghting out the battle is the only way 
man can come to self-consciousness, that is to lrnowledge of his 
potenti·al. n-~· When man realizes what these potentials are, and 
under,what conditions they are actualized, then he comes to 
understand, as Marcuse writes that "the truth of self-
consciousness is not the 'I' but the 'We', 'the ego that is we 
2 
and the We that is ego.'"· 
In the ~lave, we have a consciousness that exists only for 
another. The master, on the other hand, sees himself as an 
independent consciousness, one which exists for itself. However, 
this relationship is changed when both master and slave come to 
realize that the master is dependent upon the slave for his 
existence. It is the slave who works upon an object and gives 
it a form which can be used by the master. In shaping the thing, 
the slave becomes aware of the fact that it is dependent upon 
no one but himself for its form. He also becomes aware of the 
fact that the master is dependent upon the object for his exis-
tence and thus, through his dependence upon the object, the 
master is dependent upon the slave. The slave comes to see 
himself as existing on his o'vn account. He becomes aware of 
his feelings of fear and anxiety which have been caused by the 
master. By becoming aware of these feelings, he realizes that 
1. Ibid., P• 115. 
2. ~., p. 115. 
0 
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he has an existence of his own, he realizes that he does not 
fear for another, but for himself. The form which is taken by 
the object is not seen to be something different than con-
sciousness, but it is that very form which is seen to be his 
pure self-existence. By laboring upon the thing, self-
consciousness is realized and it is realized through an aware-
ness of its own fears. It comes to understand that it is a 
consciousness for itself, and not for another. Now to realize 
these facts is to engage in the rudiments of thinking. He does 
not just fear in the sense of reacting, as an animal might re-
act to its enemy, or as a slave might automatically react to 
the harsh commands of its master. He is thinking because he 
is aware of the fact that he is reacting. Thus, he is no 
longer the second half of a cause and effect relationship; he 
is nmr the effect which is aware of itself. To understand that 
he does not fear for another, but rather that he fears another 
for himself, is to understand that essential freedom which he, 
himself, is. This does not mean that he is yet free but 
rather it brings to light the fact that the seeds of freedom, 
the possibility of existing for himself, is a possibility 
which is in accord with his ultimate nature. Through labor and 
fear, we have made a beginning, a beginning which finds its 
end only later in the state. 
For these reasons, Hegel claims that one of the methods 
of taking possession of a thing is by forming it. In accord 
with his section on "Lordship and Bondage" in the Phenomen-
ology of Mind, Hegel writes in the Philosophy of Right that: 
/ 
15 
~ ' 
To impose a form on a thing is the mode of taking 
possession most in conformity with the idea to this 
extent, that it implies a union of subject and object, 
although it varies endlessly with the qualitative 
c~arayter of the objects and the variety of subjective 
a1ms. 
For this reason, slavery cannot be justified, it denies the 
potentiality of the slave while giving him the material to 
develop this potential. Thus, slavery is·destined, in the 
long run, to end in failure. 
The reason slavery must tail is that merely to will that 
something be mine is not sufficient to make it mine. We must 
take physical possession of the object and complete physical 
possession is impossible when the object is another human 
being. The act of physical possession, Hegel calls occupancy. 
Hegel explains that: 
' 
Since property is the embodiment of personality, 
my inward idea and will that something is to be mine 
is not enough to make it my property; to secure this 
end occupancy is requisite. The embodiment which my 
will thereby attains involves its recognisability 
by others.2 
We have seen that the will has a univeraal right to appro-
priation; it has supreme right over things. However, 
occupancy requires that that which the will appropriates be 
individualized. One cannot appropriate a universal, he must 
appropriate an individual object. We cannot take possession 
of a 'kind of thing,' we must take possession of a thing. 
Now, the will finds that matter resists its efforts, for 
1. The Philosophy of Right, p. 47. 
2. ~., P• 45. 
matter, at this stage, "is nothing except the resistance it 
offers me."1 However, because it is also of the nature of 
16 
matter to be appropriated by the will and to become one part 
of the property relation, "this independence of matter has no 
truth. n 2 It is to be super.ceded. Occupancy then depends on 
the ability of the will to overcome this resistance and thus 
it 11 comes to be conditioned by physical strength, cunning, 
dexterity, the means of one kind or another whereby we take 
physical possession of things. 113 
For Hegel, the object can only be ideal, it cannot be real 
for it is only a passing moment in a wider movement, a movement 
which is mediated by the free will. This means that the object 
has no potential in its own right, the only potential which it 
has is that which the free will chooses to give it. Without 
this free will, the object remains something which is present, 
but it is a presence without meaning, without significance. 
The only potential which an object has is the potential to be 
an object for a free will. The act of occupancy and the pro-
cess of forming the object are two modifications of property. 
In both instances, the thing as my property becomes my per-
sonality objectified. "Personality essentially involves the 
capacity for rights and constitutes the concept and the basis 
l • .I.~., p. 45. 
2. ~., p. 45. 
3 • Ibid. , p. 45 • 
-
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••• of the system of abstract and formal rights. 111 The 
object, as property, adds content to this empty and abstract 
right by translating these rights iato. an external sphere. 
The individual now has rights over something; his rights now 
refer to a definite object and he is no longer involved in 
willing merely the continuation of his biological existence. 
He now wills the continuation of the relationship in which the 
subject has placed himself with the object. As we have seen 
in the discussion of slavery, the object allows the person to 
distinguish himself from himself enabling him to see himself 
as a definite existent in distinction from other definite 
existents of the same type. He comes to see himself as a 
being which exists for itself, and, therefore, he is able to 
distinguish himself from other persons which also exist for 
themselves. Furthermore, through forming and occupancy, he is 
able to distinguish their property from his. 
In distinguishing himself from other persons, the indi-
vidual also begins to recognize that these other persons also 
have the capacity to own property, for it is the essence of 
personality that it has rights over things. Of course, this 
is only understood after the struggle of force and cunning has 
ended in some kind of tentative conclusion, after occupancy 
has been achieved and maintained. In distinguishing our-
selves from others, we have recognized not only their difference 
1. Ibid., p. 37 • 
............ 
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from us, but also their similarity to us. The recognition of 
personal~ty involves the recognition of certain rights which 
belong to that personality. At this stage, however, recogni-
tion is still abstract, the rights which are recognized exist 
only in the form of capacities or possibilities. The other 
18 
person is seen to have the capacity to appropriate things even 
though this capacity may not yet be actual. This right of 
others to own property becomes explicitly recognized in con-
tract where we acknowledge not only the capacity of someone to 
own property, but also the actuality. 
Because the desires of man can be satisfied by any one (or 
more) of an infinite number of things, and because "things 
have no right of their own, 111 because they have not the ability 
to decide their own fate, but must allow their destiny to be 
directed by man, man is able to surrender his object ta another 
person. He is able to alienate his property by exchanging it. 
1Vhen this occurs, we have what Hegel calls a contract, or a 
common will. 
In property, the thing has become an object for the will, 
existing to serve the will's purpose. And in becoming an ob-
ject ·for the will, the thing allows the will, which exists for 
itself, to objectify itself, ·to become an object for itself 
and others to see. Through the object, the will places itself 
into relationships with other wills. However, this relationship 
1. Hegel, TNe Encyclopedia of Philosophy, trans. G. E~ Mueller 
(New York: Philosophical L1brary, 1969), P• 236. 
19 
between my will and other wills is, in property, only implicit. 
The fact ·that an individual has placed his will in an object 
does not guarantee that other individuals will recognize that 
object as his. In contract, the other individual recognizes 
my right to manipulate, to exchange, or to alienate that which 
is called 'mine'. At this point, the relationship between the 
will and 'the object becomes explicit, and is complete. 
In contract we are no longer taking possession of a mere 
thing; we are now taking possession of a thing into which 
someone had previously placed his will. In contract, both 
parties consent to remove their will from the object, yet 
neither one of them cease to be owners. The will is removed 
from this particular object but it is, at the same time, 
placed in another object which had previously belonged to an-
other will. Contract "implies that each, in accordance with 
the common will of both, ceases to be an owner and yet is and 
remains one.n1 In this reciprocal relationship, a new will is 
formed and it is formed "when the two wills are associated in 
an identity in the sense that one of them comes to its decision 
only in the presence of the other. 112 In any society where in-
dividuals live together and where property is secure, this 
security rests upon the recognition by another person of my 
right to this property. And this recognition is the condition 
1. The Philosophy of Right, p. 58. 
2. ~., P• 58. 
0 
0 
0 
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of freedom. As Hegel explains: 
.Existence as determinate being is in essence 
being for another. • • • One aspect of property 
is that it is an existent as an external thing, 
and in this respect property exists for other ex-
ternal things and is connected with their necessity 
and contingency. But it is also an existent as an 
embodiment of the will and from this point of view 
the 'other' for which it exists can only be the will 
of an other person. This relation of wil1 to will 
is the true and proper ground in which freedom is 
existent.-- The sphere of contract is made up of this 
mediation whereby I hold property not merely by means 
of a thing and my subjective will, but by means of an-
other person's will as well and so in virtue of my 
participation in a common will.l 
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At the same time, the individual, if he is to understand what 
he in fact is, must understand that he is the type of being 
which can alienate his property and can enter into contractual 
relationships with other beings of the same type as himself. 
The actual fact of contract allows the individual to see his 
will as a determinate existent. This means, first of all, 
that the will is now something diff'erent than the multiplicity 
of indeterminacy and conflicting desires which we originally 
had. Secondly, the will exercises its univeTsaltiy, it aban-
dons,:> a particular piece of property while still exercising· 
its universal right over things by placing itself in another 
object, and thus holding another particular piece of property. 
Third, this means that the will has a specific quality by which 
it distinguishes itself from others and by which it, and others, 
may so distinguish it. And again, contract is the means by 
1 • Ibid. , p. 57. 
0 
0 
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which the individual comes to see its determinate and its uni-
versal qualities. As Hegel explains: 
I have power to alienate a property as an external 
thing; but more than this, the concept compels me to 
alienate it gua property in order that thereby my will 
may become objective to me as determinately existent. 
In this situation, however, my will as alienated is at 
the same time another's will. Consequently, this situa-
tion wherein this compulsion of the concept is realized 
is the unity of different wills and so a unity in which 
both surrender their differences and their own special 
character. Yet this identity of their wills implies 
(at this stage) that each will still is and remains not 
identical with the other but retains from its point of 
view a special character of its own. 1 
Since the will of both parties acknowledges this new relation-
ship, and since this relationship could not exist without this 
acknowledgement, there has come into being a common will. This 
common will now directs its energy towards maintaining this new 
relationship. However, the fact that a common will has been 
created, does not destroy the uniqueness of the individual 
property owner and looking at this uniqueness, we are quite 
willing to admit that each owner also retains a will of his own 
which is not identical with that of the other. Yet, we must 
also admit that this common will does embrace the uniqueness 
of both wills, in so far as this particular piece of property 
is concerned. In contract, we find that, although specific 
pieces of property are exchanged, there is still one thing 
which remains identical. "What remains identical is the value, 
in respect of which the subjects of the contract are equal to 
1. Ibid., p. 58 • 
........... 
• 
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one another whatever the qualitative external differences of 
the things exchanged. Value is the universal in which the 
subjects of the contract participate.n1 A contract remains 
steadfast even though the arbitrary will of one, or both of 
the parties may change. Once the contract is formed, property 
is alienated, and any relation which, in the future, may be 
established, must be based upon the relation created by the 
contract, and not the previous precontractual relationship. 
Now, contract demands for itself universal validity, de-
manding to be recognized by all. However, at this stage, the 
contract has come into existence "as the result of an arbitrary 
choice and there is therefore implicit in it the moment of con-
2 tingency, of particular preference." The fact is that the 
contract only takes into consideration the immediate wills of 
the parties involved. It claims for itself universality but 
it fails to provide the conditions for universal validity. 
The contract is arbitrary because it is the result of "imme-
diate self-sufficient persons. 113 It is particular since nthe 
object about which a contract is made is a single external 
thing ••• it is only things of that kind w'hich the parties 
purely arbitrary will has it in its power-to alienate. 114 Nor 
may contract claim that it is based on reason, for reason is 
1. 
.!ill·' p. 59 • 
2 • 
.!ill·' p. 332. {translator's notes (T.N.)) 
r 
3. ~., p. 58. 
4. Ibid., p. 64. 
-
0 
0 
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universally valid, and contract, as we have seen, has its 
validity only between particular wills. Hegel explains that: 
In contract the principle of rightness is present 
as something posited, while its inner universality is 
there as something common in the arbitrariness and 
particular will of the parties. This appearance of 
right, in which right and its essential embodiment, 
the particular will, corresponds immediately, i.e. 
fortuitously, proceeds in wrong to become a show.l 
Thus, contract which has made the claim of universality con-
tains within itself the seeds of wrong. 11hat we find in 
contract is the wills of particular individuals, wills which 
may or may not correspond to the universal will. In contract, 
the universal will is only implicit; it is posited but whether 
or not it is realized is a matter of pure coincidence. Now, 
since contract corresponds only coincidentally, if at ail to 
the universal will, it is also quite possible that the parti-
cular will may also find itself at variance with the universal 
will and, when this occurs, we have 'wrong'. The party who 
acts against the universal will may still appeal to the 'right' 
to justify his actions. However, the right to which he appeals 
is a particular, not a universal right. It is an empty word, 
the content of which is created and destroyed by the unstable 
dictates of convenience. It is used to justify a particular 
situation and to satisfy an immediate and arbitrary will. 
The recognition of rightness by the parties is 
bound up with their opposed particular interest and 
point of view. In opposition to this show of 
rightness, yet within this show itself ••• , the prin-
ciple of rightness arises as something kept in view 
1. ~., p. 64. 
and demanded by the parties. But at first it arises 
only as an 'ought-to-be' because the will is not yet 
present here as a will so freed from the immediacy of 
interest as, despite it particularity, to have the 
universal will for its aim; nor is it yet, at this 
point, characterized as a recognized actuality of such 
a sort that, in face of it, the parties would have to1 renounce their particular interest and point of view. 
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At this point, we know a number of things about the will. 
First of all, we know that it exhibits some degree of univer-
sality, it drives itself towards a goal which may· be satisfied 
bpy any one of an infinite number of objects. Secondly, we 
know that the will is free, that it has the capacity to exist 
for itself. The particular act which seeks to annul right by 
coercing the free and universal will is called 'crime'. In 
crime, my right over a thing is negated and, at the same time, 
the universality of my will is threatened. Hegel writes that: 
The initial act of coercion as an exercise of force 
by the free agent, an exercise of force which infringes 
the existence of freedom in its concrete sense, in-
fringes the right as right, is crime -- a negatively 
infinite judgement in its full sense, whereby not only 
the particular (i.e. the subsumption under my will of 
a single thing ••• ) is negated, but also the univer-
sality and infinity in the predicate 'mine' (i.e. my 
capacity for rights).l · 
The criminal, by commiting a crime makes right "a nul-
lity altogether" and is, in fact, demanding that he be 
punished for, by acting against right, he acts against his own 
freedom and his own universality. But at this point, the 
1. ~., p. 65. 
2. Ibid., P• 67. 
0· 
0 
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injured party does not see as his objective the restoring of 
right, but rather the annuling of the crime •. 
The injury which has befallen the implicit will (and 
this means the implicit will of the injuring party, 
as well as that of the injured and everyone else) has 
as little positive existence in this implicit will as 
such as it has in the mere state of affairs which it 
produces. In itself this implicit will {i.e. the right 
or law implicit) is rather that which has no external 
existence and which for that reason cannot be injured. 
Consequently, the injury from the point of view of the 
particular will of the injured party and of the on-
lookers is only something negative. The sole positive 
existence which the injury possesses is that it is the 
particular will of the criminal. Hence to injure (or 
penalize) this particular will as will determinately 
existent is to annul the crime which, otherwise! would 
have been held valid, and to restore the right. 
From the point of view of the injured party, the goal is not 
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yet one of righting a wrong which has been committed against a 
universal will. The objective, at this point, is to annul 
this particular crime and to restore this particular right. 
Nevertheless, in asserting the negative which annuls the 
crime, we are at the same time clarifying the right. For, 
when we say that to do such and such is wrong, we are, at the 
same time, saying that not to do it is right. 
The crime is an infringement on right and, as such, must 
be punished. The criminal is not punished because society is 
stronger than he though, obviously, this must be a condition 
of formal punishment. The criminal is punished because his 
immediate will must be superseded if he is to gain recogni-
tion as a person, if he is to become explicitly, what he is 
1. Ibid., p. 69. 
implicit~~· In re£using to recognize the personality which, 
in this case, means the capacity for rights of the other in-
dividual, the original is refusing to recognize his own per-
sonality. He is the one who has made force the rule, and it 
is by the rule which he has made that he is punished. He is 
punished because he demands, on the one hand, that he be re-
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cognized as a person, as a universal will, but, his act, on the 
other hand, is an act which, if applied to himself, would re-
ject his own claim to personality. By committing the crime, 
he not only refuses to recognize the personality of an other, 
he also refuses to recognize his own personality; for, as we 
have seen, ttpersonality involves the capacity for rights"1 and 
the imperative of right is not only to 11 be a person,"1 but 
also to "respect others as persons."1 Thus, not only must the 
punishment be designed to annul the crime, it must also re-
store the personality (the universal character) of the 
criminal. 
Hegel argues that: 
The injury (the penalty) which falls on the criminal 
is not merely implicitly just -- as just, it is ~ ipso 
his implicit will, an embodiment of his freedom, his 
right; on the contrary, it is also a right established 
within the crimin~l himself, i.e. in his objectively 
embodied will, in his action. The reason for this is 
that his action is the action of a rational being and 
this implies that it is something universal and that 
by doing it ~he criminal has laid down a law which he 
has explicitly recognized in his action and under which2 in consequence he should be brought as under his right. 
1. ~., p. 37. 
2 • .!ill· ' p • 70 • 
• 
• 
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Thus, by committing a crime, the criminal gives society 
the right and the duty to act towards him as he has acted to-
wards it. And, society by punishing the criminal is treating 
him as a person and as a pational being. Yet, we must not 
1 think that society is obliged to treat the act of the criminal 
as the type of universal which is applicable to all members of 
that society. A society cannot treat all its members in the 
same concrete manner in which it treats the criminal. True, 
it must treat each person as a universal, but the universality 
which the criminal demands, is the type which annihilates his 
act. Society must view the crime as a moment in a total pro-
cess, which as a process affirms the universal. The crime is 
a moment w4ich must be transcended. If society were to treat 
al~ its citizens as it treats the criminal, it would not only 
be mistaking one moment in the process, as the process as a 
whole, but this mistake would itself result in the destruction 
of society. For this reason, punishment is not to be mistaken 
for revenge, for revenge only affirms the isolated moment in an 
infinite way. "Hence revenge, because it is a positive action 
of a particular will, becomes a new transgression; as thus con-
tradictory in character, it falls into an infinite progression 
and descends from one generation to another~ infinitum. 111 
Crime arises only after contracts have been formed, for it 
is only after the universality of the will has been posited 
1. ~., p. 73. 
• 
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that it may be negated. Crime is the initial act of coercion 
and as the initial act, it is an infringement on freedom, and 
thus wrong. Further acts of coercion which are designed to 
annul the crime are not to be considered as wrong. We are no 
longer judging an act by its~lf but rather by its intention. 
Coercion is not judged to be wrong merely because it is coercion, 
it is judged to be wrong if its design is to threaten person-
ality. The coercion which negates the negation, the coercion 
which punishment is, is necessary for the development of free-
dom and universality. THus, the negation of a negation ia it-
self an affirmation and the affirmation is called by Hegel, 
'morality'. Morality, in accord with coercion, affirms the im-
portance of intention, and, in accord with 'right', i~ reaf-
firms the universal. It is the intention to affirm the 
universal. 
So far as right in the strict sense was concerned, 
it was of no importance what my intention or principle 
was. This question about .the self-determination and 
motive of the will, like the question about the purpose·, 
now enters at this point in connection with morality. 
Since man wishes to be judged in accordance with his own 
self-determinated choices, he is free in thi$ relation 
to himself whatever the external situation may impose on 
him. No one can break in upon this inner conviction o£ 
mankind, no violence can be done to it, and the moral 
will therefore is inaccessible. Man's worth is esti-
mated by reference to his inward actions and hence the ! 
standpoint of morality is that of freedom aware of itself. 
In abstract right, the question arises as to who is to de-
termine the standard of right and wrong; who is qualified to 
1. Ibid., p. 248. 
• 
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judge intent? Not only must we ask what part of society is 
qualified to judge intention and to determine the laws of cor-
rect behavior, but we must also ask what society for, at this 
stage, we have abstracted the property relations from the 
state and thus we have no legally binding institutions. All 
that we do know at this stage is that if an act represents a 
norm for others to follow, then the repercussions of certain 
acts will tend not only to destroy the agent of the act, but 
also the entire society, whatever that society may be. 
By reflecting upon his wrong act, the agent becomes aware 
of himself as a moral agent. He comes to realize that by 
denying the universal law he denies his own rationality and, 
consequently, refuses to recognize himself as a person. 
Through the movement from property to wrong, the individual 
achieves an awareness of the universal will and, at the same 
time, he discovers that his own existence and his own person-
ality and rights demand upon the actualization of this univer-
sal. The universal does not annihilate the particular but 
rather creates the conditions whereby this particular may re-
alize its fullest potential. To be a universal means to be a 
will which operates for the particular and is either impli-
citly, or explicitly willed by the particular. Once the nega-
tion of the negation, or the punishment of the crime, is 
introduced, we have passed from abstract right to morality. 
Hegel writes that this movement: 
is the demand for a justice freed from subjective interest 
0 
0 
0 
and a subjective form and is no longer contingent on 
might, i.e. it is the demand for justice not as re-
Yenge but as punishment. Fundamentally, this implies 
the demand for a will which, though particular and 
subjective,, ••• wills the universal •••• But 
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this concept of morality is not simply something deman~ed; 
it has emerged in the course of this movement itself.l 
1. ~., p. 73. 
CHAPTER III 
MORALITY AND ITS DENIAL OF THE ACTUAL WORLD 
Hegel showed that, in the sphere of abstract right, prop-
erty gave embodiment to man's abstract will. Once this em-
bodiment was achieved through property, the individual entered 
into contractual relations with other individuals, forming a 
common will. Yet, at this stage, no distinction was made be-
tween what man can do and what he should do. In abstract 
right, man had a right to anything he could possibly obtain. 
However, he soon finds out that his right is limited by the 
right and power of others. At this point, the common will is 
formed, but this common will has no regard for the individual 
outside of itself. However, as soon as a wrong is committed, 
or the common will broken, we find we must have some universal 
and objective reference by which to judge this wrong. Yet, 
all we have, at this point, is a common will which, although 
it makes the claim of universality, fails to prove its claim. 
The only evidence present that there is such a thing as a uni-
versal will is the self-annihilating character of the wrong. 
As we have seen, there arises nthe demand for a justice 
freed from subjective interest and a subjective form and no 
longer contingent on might, i.e. it is the de~and for justice 
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not as revenge but as punishment. 111 "The moral standpoint," 
Hegel writes, "is reached when the free pers.on identifies his 
subjective will with an objective and universal moral law; or 
when a universal law becomes his will. 112 But morality knows 
only that there is such a law, it does not yet know what the 
content of that law is. In property, we were concerned only 
with our own will and our own rights, in morality, we are con-
cexned with the welfare of others and with the universal wel-
fare. This universal welfare includes more than the good for 
any one person, or even the good for all persons now living, 
its scope is much wider; it includes these elements plus the 
good for any future person who might exist. But, even this is 
not enough. Universal welfare must include not only the above 
mentioned elements, it must also include the good for organi-
zations, communities, nations, both isolated and in relation 
to one another. But, at this point, our achievement is in our 
intent, not in our knowledge. No longer do we wish to ignore 
the universal principle as we had attempted to do in 'wrong'; 
no longer is the universal will identified with the common 
will as contract had mistakenly claimed. We are now aware of 
an objective, universal will whose scope extends far beyond 
that of the common will and yet, which is found to be in ac-
cord with our own particular will and which may be discovered 
1. The Philosophy of Right, p. 73. 
2. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, pp. 239-240. 
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by an inspection of our own subjectivity. In the area of ab-
stract right, our concern was with the legal, in the area of 
morality it is with the good. The will, in discovering that 
it is able to alienate its property, discovers also that its 
own being is not dependent upon any particular thing. With 
this discovery, the individual is able to tear his will away 
from the egoistic restrictions which property placed upon it 
and to turn his attention inward, in order to seek within him-
self, the clue to the universal will. Property, as the pri-
mary determinant of individual activity, is replaced by the 
motivating power of personal conviction. This inwardly turned 
will is far more stable than the will which found its power in 
property. In property, the will depended for its strength upon 
the chaotic forces of nature and upon the sometimes arbitrary 
wills of its neighbors; in morality, it depends on nothing but 
itself for its stability. The world outside may be quite dif-
ferent from the world as we are convinced it ought to be, but 
no outside force can compel us to change those convictions. 
We are, like the stoic, free to ignore our chains and maintain 
our highest ideals. Yet, we cannot say that our freedom is un-
limited for every action is determined by that outside world, 
by that world which we have chosen to ignore but which we can-
not deny. We cannot help but think how much better these 
ideals would be if they were to reside not merely in one sub-
jective mind, but in the actual world as well. At this point, 
these ideals are not actual. 
--
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Even though the development of the will is not complete 
in 'morality', we have advanced far beyond the development 
~eached in the phase of abstract right called 'crime'. In 
crime, we saw that the will was only implicitly united with 
the universal will while, explicitly, it was in opposition to 
that will. In morality, the individual, through the under-
standing that his own will is identical with the universal 
will, is consciously united with that will. However, at this 
stage, the individual is only aware that the unity exists, he 
does not yet know what it is. Later, when we ~fxive &t tho 
stage called 'the ethical life,'. the union between the in-
dividual and the universal will is completed. At that point, 
the subject is not only aware of the fact that such a union 
does exist, he also understands what it is. 
If our analysis had begun with an examination of morality, 
we would have still been able to posit the earlier stage of 
crime and the latter stage of the ethical life. For, from tha 
standpoint of a will which is aware of its unity with the uni-
versal will, but does not yet know what the content of that 
unity is, we would, on the one hand, be able to posit a will 
which was not aware of that unity, and on the other, a will 
which was not only aware of that unity but also understood hhw 
it was constituted. 
Both crime and morality depend on an appeal to the sub-
jective individual. The criminal acts to satisfy his own im-
mediate self-interest while the moral person turns his 
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attention inward to discover what ought-to-be. Both of these 
movements are involved in following their own inner demands, 
crime in following the demands of its immediate passions with-
out regard for the universal, morality in demanding an ought-
to-be without giving due recognition to what is. Morality 
forgets the actual, it forgets that which we are analyzing, it 
forms its goals without giving due recognition to the means for 
actualizing goals, it forgets the state. As Hegel writes: 
One word more about giving instruction as to what 
the world ought to be. Philosophy, in any case, comes 
on the scene too late to give it. As the thought of 
the world, it appears only when actuality is already 
there cut and dried after its process of formation has 
been completed. The teaching of the concept, which is 
also history's inescapable lesson, is that it is only 
when actuality is mature that the ideal first appears 
over against the real and that the ideal apprehends 
this same real world in its substance and builds it up 
for itself into the shape of an intellectual realm. 
When philosophy paints its grey in grey, then has the 
shape of life grown old. By philosophy's grey in grey 
it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood. The owl 1 
of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling dusk. 
The fact that the moral will sets up an ought-to-be which 
is in opposition to the external world serves to demonstrate 
that, while the concept of the will as infinite is a concept 
which is present in the moral will, this infinity is not yet 
actual; for the moral will, in being limited by the outside 
world,displays its finitude. In property, the will was ex-
plicitly limited by its object. Its universality was only im-
plicit and it took contract to explicate this universality. 
In property, any object potentially existed for some will, and 
1. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, pp. 12-13. 
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the will could choose to determine itself by placing itself 
in any one of these objects. But the fact that it did place 
itself in one object, concealed, for the moment, its univer-
sality. Now, in morality, w~ have the antithesis of property. 
For, in morality, the individual will sees itself as identical 
with the universal will and in this identity, it denies the 
reality of the external world; it denies both the world of 
property, and the world which is later to be known as the eth-
ical life. In identifying itself with the universal will, the 
individual will sees itself as unlimited and infinite, yet 
this infinity, like everything else in morality, turns out to 
be nothing more than an ought-to-be; and as an ought-to-be, it 
is limited. It is limited by what is, and thus this 'infinite' 
4it · will comes to display its finitude. The will knows that it 
ought-to-be unlimited and infinite, yet it finds itself re-
stricted and finite. As the process continues, this moral will 
must eventually deny even its identity with the absolute, for 
it cannot be said that the absolute good is an ought-to-be, 
for an ought-to-be lacks one quality which the absolute de-
mands, and that is the quality of actuality. An ought-to-be 
which can be is a great deal better than one which could never 
be. Hegel writes that: 
The good, therefore, is not merely that which ought to 
be; what ought to be is included in the total affirma-
tion of the struggle as a whole, which is as it ought 
to be; it cannot be different from what it is. To de-
mand that it ought to be different is a refusal to 
' ' 
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accept practical activity- a futile escape. 1 
The good demands the realization of subjective intent. That 
which is intended but is not realized cannot be called 'good' 
nor can that which is realized but which the subject does not 
intend be called 'good'. Thus, the person who wills what can-
not be, does not will the good. The moral person who desires 
universal welfare directs his will towards an abstract and 
empty goal. Welfare without right is no welfare at all but 
merely the whimsical benevolence of an all powerful master; 
true welfare must imply rights and rights implies law. Now 
law carries with it the possibility that the law may be broken 
and punishment is required for those who break the law. Pun-
ishment contradicts the notion of welfare for all. Thus, wel-
fare without right cannot be the good, but neither can right 
without welfare be the good; for, certainly, if we say that 
everyone has an equal right to starve, we cannot consider this 
condition good. There are some situations in which the in-
dividual, himself, necessitates the removal of his own wel-
fare. We must understand that welfare carried to extreme 
would have all men, good and bad alike, outside the prison 
wall. Hegel believes that: 
It is one of the commonest blunders of abstract thinking 
to make private rights and private welfare count as 2 
absolute in opposition to the universality of the state. 
1. Hegel, The Encyclopedia, p. 233. 
2. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, p. 85. 
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Thus, the reality of property, right and crime force the 
notion of welfare to fall apart and pass over to the notion of 
the good. Haplessly though, we have but an abstract idea of 
the good; we know that we ought to do the good and we justify 
our actions by appealing to the good, but we do not yet under-
stand what the good is. We are presently at the stage which 
Kant had reached when declaring that the good should be our 
aim and our goal. At this point, "every duty is absolute, but 
it is also in conflict with other duties which are equally 
absolute ... ,l 
While morality has developed certain concepts which had 
been only implicit in abstract right, it has also developed 
within itself many contradictions which must be resolved. As 
we have seen, the good which morality seeks is an abstract 
good, lacking content. Man wishes to do the good but he is 
unable to find out what 'doing the good' means. The external 
world of right and property is ignored by the person in moral-
ity but yet, it is this external world which limits his will 
and makes it finite. Consciousness, which desired so strongly 
to establish itself as a universal and rational rule with ab-
solute validity finds that it can app~al only to itself and 
its own private reason for this validity and this, of course, 
fails the test of universality. The fact that we appeal only 
to ourselves for the good makes the good much lik~ evil; In 
1. H~gel, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, p. 242. 
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this good we had appealed to an ought-to-be which rested on 
the identity between the particular and the universal will, an 
identity which turned out to be vague and contentless. Such 
an identity cannot be called an identity at all and the appeal 
which rests on it is as invalid as the identity itself. In the 
area of social science, the tendency of morality to turn inward 
facilitates the mental creation of vague and distant utopias 
which~ if they are to be realized demand the forceful and sud-
den overthrow of everything that is (whether good or evil). 
In the end, morality destroys the distinction between good 
and evil and reduces ethics to relativism which is the exact 
opposite of what it originally wanted. For in appealing only 
to himself for the validity of a moral law, the individual is 
giving license to all other persons to make a similar subjective 
appeal. Thus, any universaltiy which might be found is lost 
and the name 'society' becomes a sham. The nature of man is 
essentially universal, but this universality must be developed, 
it does not spring forth in full blossom at birth. Neither 
does it reach full maturity the moment man becomes unsatisfied 
with the plight of his fellow men, nor is it fully developed 
immediately after man begins to search his own soul for the 
answer to the human condition. It is not even fully developed 
when man realizes that his nature is universal. These steps 
are only the beginning and man must not make the mistake of 
taking one or two steps in the process for the entire process. 
It would be impossible to actualize every man's private 
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opinions, the task is to discover which opinions are worthy of 
actuality. 
Even the subje~tive freedom of the individual is incomplete 
if he only recognizes himself (in the form of immediate de-
sires) as the only judge of what he ought and what he ought 
not to do. Just as the child needs authority to temper his 
f'reedom, :s.o man needs direction to order and give meaning to 
his. Both the order and the meaning are found when the indi-
vidual gives his allegiance to those institutions which are a 
part of what Hegel calls 'the ethical life.' The moral will, 
which sees itself as a unit isolated from its surroundings 
must identify itself with these surroundings and seek its 
place among.them. In order to make the improvements it de-
sires, it must discover the tools with which it must work and 
it must learn how these tools are to be used most effectively. 
Only in this way may the individual realize his universal na-
ture and actualize his concrete freedom. In morality, we 
found separations between the universal and the particular, 
between willing the good and doing the good, and between free-
dom and authority; these separations must be overcome, but we 
must understand that once they are overcome, we are no longer 
in the area of morality, we are then engaged in the ethical 
life. 
0 
0 
0 
CHAPTER IV 
PROPERTY IN THE ETHICAL LIFE 
Morality, in the last analysis, turns out to be pure sub-
jectivity. In the ethical life, this subjectivity is not 
totally destroyed but it is modified and its contradictions 
' 
resolved. In the ethical life, we find elements of objectiv-
ity in the subject and elements of subjectivity in the object. 
Hegel explains this movement as follows: 
For the good as the substantial universal of freedom, 
but as something still abstract, there are therefore 
required determinate characteristics of some sort and 
the principle for determining them, though a principle 
identical with the good itself. For conscience simi-
larly, as the purely abstract principle of determination, 
it is required that its decisions shall be universal and 
objective. If good and conscience are each kept abstract 
and thereby elevated to independent totalities, then both 
become the indeterminate which ought to be determined.--
But the integration of these two relative totalities 
into an absolute identity has already been implicitly 
achieved in that this very subjectivity of pure self-
certainity, aware in its vacuity of its gradual evap-
oration, is identical with the abstract universality of 
the good. The identity of the good with the subjective 
will, an identity which there£ore is concrete and the 
truth of them both, is Ethical Life.l 
The free will must overcome the contradictions of morality and 
it does this by turning its attention outward into the insti-
tutions of society. Morality had initiated the identification 
of the good with the subjective will, but the identity re-
mained merely abstract. The task of the ethical life is to 
1. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, p. 103. 
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actualize this identity and to make it concrete. In this re-
spect, Hegel calls the institutions of the ethical life sub-
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stance, ox those institutions which are required in order to 
maintain the unity of everything else. Without these insti-
tutions, man would fall back to the contradi'ctions of morality 
and the particularity of abstract right. These institutions 
provide the order which allows subjective freedom to be actu-
alized, rights to be protected and welfare to be preserved. 
Ethical life is the freedom which is no't onlY,: able to will the 
good but is also able to actualize it. Neither the right nor 
the moral was able to do this for the right laclted the subjec-
tivity which is necessary £or freedom while the moral lacked 
the objectivity which is ne~essary for actuality. Hegel ex-
plains that: 
The unity of the subjective w·ith the objective and 
absolute good is ethical life, and in it we find 
the reconciliation which accords with the concept. 
Morality is the form of the will in general on its 
subjective side. Ethical life is more than the 
subjective form and the self-determination of the , 
will; in addition it has as its content the concept 
of the will, namely freedom. The right and the moral 
cannot exist independently; they must have the ethi-
cal as their support and foundation, for the right 
lacks the moment of subjectivity, while morality, in 
turn, possesses that moment alone, and consequently 
both the right and the moral lack actuality by them-
selves. Only the infinite, the idea is actual. 1 
Ethical order is the good made concrete through. the activ-
' 
ity of individuals. Once this concrete good is established, 
it exists as a stabilizing force governing the subjective 
1. ~., p. 259. 
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wills of these same individuals. These institutions stand 
above the subject and, at first glance, appear to be some-
thing quite different from him. However, upon closer exam-
ination we find that through these institutions, the subject 
is able to realize his o'vn essence. He begins to see that 
these institutions do not exist over and above him, but he 
sees that these institutions exist for him, and he comes to 
see himself as existing for these institutions. Thus, there 
exists a fundamental identity between the subject {the person) 
and the object {the institutions of the ethical life}. The 
person realizes that his freedom requires the order which 
these institutions sustain. Because he sees that this order 
does exist for his freedom, he comes to direct his freedom to-
wards the goal of sustaining that order. The identity is much 
more complete than it was in right where another will stood 
over and against the individual or, ax it was in morality, 
where the individual completely ignored the world outside. 
Here in the ethical life, subject and object exist for and can 
be found in one another. The institutions of the ethical life 
are the universal and the ethical individual is the one who 
understands that, in working for these institutions, he is 
working for the universal and, consequently, working for him-
self. This person is able to see the good in what is, and he 
is able to use the tools at his disposal to achieve what can 
and ought to be. He understands that, by supporting the order 
and the limits which these institutions establish, he is 
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supporting "the whole stability of his particular ends.n1 As 
H·Ergel writes: 
Concrete social wholes condition and make possible 
the integrity of the individual to be for himself 
and to take care of his own affairs. Concurrently, 
the whole is the common product of all individual 
inner activities through which alone it comes about •••• 
The welfare of the whole means the welfare of its mem-
bers and the converse. To know this and to be loyal to 
it is the mutual trust which is the substantial core of 
social ethics. It implies that f*eedom for all and 
freedom for each are inseparable.~ 
However, we see in The Philosophy of History that in so far as 
an institution does not exist for the individual, and/or in so 
far as an individual does not recognize that the institutions 
exist for him, than this relationship is that much less than 
the one required for the ethical life. 3 Thus, it is that an 
organization, calling itself a state but existing merely for 
the benefit of a small ruling class, is much less a state than 
the organization which exists for the totality of its parts. 
In the ethical life, such things as right and duty go to-
gether. In the sphere of abstract right, Hegel says, ni have 
. 4 
the right and another has the corresponding duty." The owner 
had the right to his property and it was the duty of all other 
persons to recognize that right; the·owner had an absolute 
right to do what he liked with his property. In morality, 
1. !.£!!· ' p. 109 
2. Hegel, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, p. 246. 
3. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (New 
York: Dover Publications, Inc. 1956), P• 456. 
4. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, p. 127. 
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right and duty ought to go together but, in fact; they do 
1 
not. In the ethical life, the person who has a right to own 
property has the corresponding duty to care for that property 
and the person who has the duty to recognize the right of an-
other to own property has the corresponding right to own prop-
erty himself. 
The general movement of the ethical life is stated by 
Hegel as follows: 
(A) ethical mind in its natural or immediate phase--
the family. This substantiality loses its unity, 
passes over into division, and into the phase of 
relation, i.e. into 
(B) Civil Society-- an association of members as self-
subsistent individuals in a universality which, 
because of their self-subsistence, is only abstract. 
Their association is brought about by their needs, 
by the legal system-- the means to security of per-
son and property-- and by an external organization 
for attaining t~eir particular and common interests. 
This external state 
(C) is brought back to and welded dnto unity in the 
Constitution of the State which is the end and actu-
ality of both the substantial universal order and 
the public life devoted thereto.2 
~ Family 
The family is the first unit which gives concrete direc-
tion to freedom and as the first unit, it is united by feel-
ing. Since the ethical idea may be described as the individual 
working for himself through working for another, marriage may 
be seen as "the ethical idea in its immediacy. 113 .At this 
1. ~., p. 127. 
2. ~., p. 110. 
3. ~·, P• 118. 
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stage, the actuality of the idea is dependent upon "subjective 
feeling and disposition. 111 Because the existence of the fam-
ily depends partially upon subjective caprice, its substan-
tiality is mixed with "natural contingency and inner arbitrari-
2 
ness." Th·e family is substance for its members;· it directs 
their freedom, orders their existence and molds each member 
into the type of person which he is. The family, like the 
other institutions of the ethical life, is called "objective 
mind" for, through the subjective feelings of its members, the 
family arises as an objective institution which stands ready to 
direct these feelings. 
The fact that each member of the family works for the 
other members, establishes the initial relationship between 
the family memper and property. The object upon which the 
member of the family works is no longer designated by the word 
'mine', but rather by the word 'ours'. This common ownership 
of property is determined not only by contract (although the 
marriage contract is certainly involved), it is established by 
the personal relationship and mutual feeling which exists be-
tween members of the same family. It is this common property 
which gives the family its external existence for the property 
of the family is a manifestation of its essence, the willing-~· 
ness of one member to share with another. The property which 
1 • .!ill·' p. 118. 
2. ~., p. 121. 
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the family possesses is different from the property which was 
controlled by "the arbitrariness of a single owner's particu-
lar needs. 111 The property which the family possesses is 
called by Hegel, 'capital'. The family "requires possession 
specifically determined as permanent and secure."2 One member 
does not have the right to destroy what is commonly owned. 
The permanent and common property, or the capital which the 
family owns transforms the private property of one arbitrary 
person into something ethical. 
It is not merely property which a family possesses; as 
a universal and enduring person, it requires possessions 
specifically determined as permanent and secure, i.e.'it 
requires capital. The arbitrariness of a single owners 
particular needs is one moment in property taken abstract-
ly; but this moment, together with the selfishness of 
desire, is here transformed into something ethical, into 
labour and care for a common possession.3 
The common capital of the family provides for the educa-
_tion of the children and once this education is complete, the 
children become free persons in their own right. They now 
have the right to own property and to raise their own fami-
lies. It is at this point that the one family breaks down in-
to a multitude of families. Thus, property, in the form of 
capital, which was so instrumental in the development of the 
family now becomes responsible for its dissolution. As the 
family dissolves, we find that, in place of the one family, we 
1. Ibid., p. 116. 
2. ~., p. 116. 
3. ~., p. 116. 
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now have a plurality of families, families where the members 
of one are externally related to the members of another. This 
is the movement from the family to civil society; the movement 
from the immediate form of the ethical life to what Hegel 
1 calls "the world of ethical appearance." 
Civil Society 
The Movement from the Family to Civil Society. 
, 
The movement from the family to civil society is the move-
ment from an internally self-related unit to a number of ex-
ternally related units. The members of civil society are not 
bound together by ~ubjective feeling and love; they are related 
to each other through· economic necessity. In civil society 
each person works for his own selfish end and the universal 
and particular are at odds. ·Each person works for his own 
benefit and he sees no relation between his welfare and the 
welfare of others. Paying taxes, entering the army, serving 
on a jury are all seen as self-injurious to the member of civil 
society. But slowly, and initially undetected, there is built 
up a relationship in which the welfare of an individual is de-
pendent upon the welfare of the whole. In order for one man 
to prosper, government must be strong enough to protect his 
wealth; it m~st have money to provide a police force, men to 
form an army, and institutions to administer justice. Thus, 
private wealth is dependent upon public wealth. But public 
1. Ibid., p. 122. 
0 
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wealth also depends on private wealth. As a man works to ac-
cumulate wealth, he also creates something of universal value 
by working upon an object and changing its form. As civil 
society progresses, the individual becomes aware of this in-
terrelationship, but he still views the other parts as some-
thing outside of himself. The rest of society is important 
only in so far as it allows him to sa~isfy his own selfish and 
particular economic needs. Thus, it is that in civil society 
"the idea seems to have fallen asunder and it looks as if ethi-
cal life, which is essentially social, were lost in a riot of 
self-seeking."! The state is seen only as a convenience to 
protect the particular goals of the individual. Again, it is 
property which is so instrumental in creating this diremption 
between the particular and the universal. It is property and 
the desire t~ aggrandize which causes the individual to regard 
the universal in such poor light. Nothing is so important to 
the property owner as increasing his own wealth, and everything 
else, laws and institutions, become secondary to that goal. 
As Marcuse explains, "all the organizations of civil society 
are for 'the protection of property,' and the freedom of that 
society means only 'the right of property.' The estates must 
be regulated by external forces that are more powerful than 
the economic mechanisms. 112 This society must eventually give 
1. ~., p. 354. Translator's notes (T. N.) 
2. Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: He el and 
of Social Theory Boston: eacon Hill Press, 19 0 
• 
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way to one in whi£h economics is directed by the spirit of the 
idea and where that spirit directs the movement of the govern-
ment and the people. 
The Civil Society of Hegel and the State of the 
Seventeenth Century Liberal Theorists 
Civil society is to Hegel what the state is to the liberal 
theorists such as Hobbes, Locke and Adam Smith. It is the in-
dividual seen as isolated from and conflicting with his fellow 
man. The state, to these liberal theorists, is seen merely as 
an instrument established as a convenience to man designed to 
' 
control his self-destructive whims. The •state' is seen as 
something different than man; it stands outside of him and 
even though it works for man, it is not supposed to be in the 
nature of man to work for the state. The problem for these 
theoris~s is that, in isolating man from one another and'from 
the state, they can find no way to explain such phenomena as 
love or patriotism. Their own tendency to analyze without 
drawing the parts together in a realistic synthesis forces 
them to set up such artificial entities as a 1 s~ate of nature' 
to· explain these phenomena. Hegel avoids these difficulties by 
suggesting that man's nature is not one of isolation, but 
rather, as Aristotle maintained, man is a social animal. 
Hegel agrees with Hobbes that the state must control the par-
ticular whims of the individual. For he says that: 
Particularity by itself, given free rein in every 
direction to satisfy its needs~ acciden.ta~ ca..p.ric.e.s., 
and ·subjective desires, destroys itself and its 
substantive concept in this process of gratification. 
At the same time, the satisfaction of need, necessary 
and accidental alike, is accidental because it breeds 
new desires without end, is in thoroughgoing depend-
ence on caprice and external accident, and is held 
in check by the power of universality.l 
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However, Hegel does not believe that the function of the state 
is merely negative, rather it controls these whims for a pur-
pose. Man's final nature is not only social, it is also de-
signed to be in harmonious relationship with the universal. 
When this is achieved, then Hobbes' state is replaced by 
Hegel's. It is true that this na~ure must be developed and 
that civil society is one phase of this development, but it is 
not true that the state which best fulfills man's nature is a 
state that stands outside of and against man. That state is 
not contrary to man's nature, it is a part of it. As we have 
seen, Hegel might have an easier time explaining such atti- ' 
tudes as love and patrietism than the theorists of the liberal 
tradition. However, it might be objected that Hegel is unable 
to explain the facts of crime, or selfishness. Hegel's an-
; 
swer would be that the state is a concept which describes a 
movement and a development. Crime and selfishness are facts 
o1 existence, the same as love and patriotism. Neither is to D~ 
be denied; however, what we must do is examine these facts and 
discover which of them are most in accord with man in his 
highest form. The problem with the liberal theorist is that 
1. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, p. 123. 
• 
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he is forced to deny the importance of one of the two poles as 
a human motivating force. Man is motivated by love and he is 
motivated by hate; the task of the philosopher is to see at 
what stages in man's development each of these forces come in-
to play and what the results of them are. But again, we might 
ask Hegel whether such a thing as a state, as he uses the word, 
ever existed, or ever will exist if one admits that man is 
. 
motivated by hatred as well as love. Given such facts as brib-
ery, income tax evasion and all the nasty habits that seem to 
go with the modern state, how is he able even to use the same 
word in describing this unity between the universal and the 
particular. Hegel might answer that he is describing a de-
velopment and because it is a development, there is no reason 
to assume that it has yet reached perfection. Now this answer 
brings us to the heart of the problem, for now we may ask in 
what way do these terms, 'civil society', 'the state', etc. 
designate an object? ·no they describe pure and existential 
moments which follow each other unadulterated in chronological 
succession, or are they used more to describe a development in 
which none of its stages is ever found isolated and pure? We 
must recall that Hegel's method is one of developing each 
phase of experience to its completion and allowing that phase 
to fall apart through its o1rn inner tensions and thus pass on 
to the next phase. However, eaph phase contains within itself 
moments of the higher phase as well as moments of the lower. 
Thus, if we examined any section of civil society, we would 
... 
.· 
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find selfishness and private interests playing a large role in 
that section. However, we might also find that much of the 
shenanigans found in dealing (or double dealing) with our 
neighbor is directed towards the welfare of the family, an in-
terest which is directed, in part by love. We might also find 
some elements of national pride, or patriotism, the type where 
we praise our country Q~t cheat on our income tax. We might 
also find that the attitude of members of this society is con-
tinuously fluctuating between a concern for what they see as 
their own private goals and a concern for what they see as the 
goals of the state. Thus, within one section of civil society 
we are able to see elements of the family and elements of the 
state. It is Hegel's belief that, given sufficient time, the 
individual will realize that his interests are the interests 
of the state and that the interests of the state are his in-
terests. In time, the identity will be completed and it is in 
'time' that Hegel places his utmost faith. With the state will 
come the truth of the family and the truth of civil society. 
This truth arises when the state fulfills and its members 
understand the fact that the individuals and his institutions 
are internally related in a manner that makes the well-being 
of one dependent upon and identical with the well-being of the 
other. Thus, the movement does not have to be strictly chro-
nological, it may fluctuate between .. stages and within any one 
stage, we can find elements of the other. 
Civil society cannot be the final purpose of man, for it 
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contains within itself contradictions which must be resolved. 
Civil society exists, primarily, to serve the interests of the 
few; those who are ruled do not identify themselves with the 
universal, but rule for themselves and not for the citizen. 
Civil society is a universal whose content is outside of and, 
therefore, not a part of itself; it is an abstract universal. 
Yet, however abstract a universal civil society might be, 
we must remember that it is part of a total movement which 
moves towards concreteness and unity, towards what Hegel calls 
'the state'. Civil society might best be described as a state 
of becoming and in examining this state, we must examine the 
total· movement. 
The Movement of Civil Society 
The immediate embodiment of the idea as manifested by the 
family has dissolved and in its place we find the idea torn 
apart into a number of disunited units. However, within these 
units are to be found the seeds of a more complete unity. 
·As the family dissolves into numerous units, each attempt-
ing to satisfy its own material needs, it is discovered that 
the one units need - satisfaction often conflicts with the 
need - satisfaction o£ another unit. Civil society arises to 
mediate these conflicts and to alleviate the satisfaction of 
needs. As society progresses, the means by which these needs 
are satisfied become specialized and diversified and these 
means become necessary for the satisfaction of basic needs; 
thus, the means of satisfaction become needs in their own 
·~ .. 
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right. Hegel calls them 'abstract needs'. Through labor, man 
produces the means by which to satisfy his own needs and by 
changing the form of the raw material, his needs are satis-
fied. However, by changing the form of this material, he 
gives it universal value for the object is now designed to 
satisfy any common need of a certain type. Owing to efficien-
cy, a division of labor is established where one man becomes 
specialized in one narrow area of need-satisfaction. The pro-
duction of the finished product now is dependent upon the 
effort of many individuals, each depending upon the other for 
the completion of the task. Through this process of division 
of labor, each man's "self-seeking turns into a contribution 
. 1 
to the satisfaction of the needs of everyone else." The 
amount of wealth which a man receives is conditioned by his 
skills and by the wealth which he already possesses and is, 
therefore, able to invest. In this respect, men are born un-
equal and, as Hegel writes, it is folly to oppose this 
unequality. 
Men are made unequal by nature, 4 ~ ~ and in civil 
society the right of particularity is so far from 
annulling this natural inequality that it produces 
it out of mind and raisex it'to an inequality of 
skill and resources, and even to one of moral and 
intellectual attainment. To ·oppose to this right 
a demand for equality is a folly of the under-
standing which takes as real and rational its ab-
stract equality and its 'ought-to-be.' 2 
1. ~., P• 129. 
2. ~., P• 130. 
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In this connection, Hegel opposes the type of system which 
would set up an equal distribution of goods. The fact that 
men are unequal in thrift and skills would soon destroy such a 
system and a system so easily destroyed is better not even be-
gun. The fact that a man develops through the ownership of 
property only suggests that all men must have property, it 
does not suggest that all property holdings must be equal. It 
would not be just to limit a man's freedom and to destroy his 
initiative by demanding that his property be no more and no 
less than his neighbor's. Hegel explains that: 
The equality which might be set up, e.g. in 
connection with the distribution of goods, would 
all the same soon be destroyed again, because 
wealth depends on diligence. But i£ a project 
cannot be executed, it ought not to be executed. 
Of course men.are equal, but only qua persons, 
that is, with respect only to the source from 
which possession springs; the inference from this 
is that everyone must have property. Hence, if 
you wish to talk of equality, it is this equality 
which you must have in view. But this equality is 
something apart from the fixing of particular 
amounts •••• From this point of view it is false 
to maintain, that justice requires everyone's 
property to be equal, since it requires only that 
everyone shall own property.l 
Because of the differences in resources and skills and be-
cause of the division of labor, a class system becomes estab-
\ 
lished. These classes are the agricultural, the business 
class and the class of civil servants. 
Hegel looks upon agriculture as the "real beginning and 
1. ~., p. 237. 
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original foundation of the state."1 It is with the cultiva-
tion of the land that private property in the form of capital, 
and marriage in a more sophisticated form than mere propaga-
tion, have their beginning. These institutions are essential 
to the formation of the state for through them the individual 
is drawn out of himself and directs his energy towards working 
for something which is other than himself and yet which becomes 
a part of that self. 2 
The business class is essential for the mediation of the 
needs of one man with the labor of another. This entire sys-
tem is a rather tight circle where need-mediation and division 
of labor give rise to a class system and one of the classes in 
this system has the task of developing further the mediation 
of needs with the division of labor. 
The class of civil servants serve to discover and to pro-
teet the universal's interest. The class system, as a whole, 
orders man's existence and gives his movements form and char-
acter. It is only through orde~ and form that man achieves 
actuality; his actuality must take place in a society and, in 
1. ~., p. 131. 
2. Hegel calls the agricultural class the substantial or im-
mediate class, perhaps because their task is to produce the 
immediate or raw material. The business class is called 
the formal or reflecting class, most likely because it is 
instrumental in giving form to the raw material. Civil 
servant, he calls the universal class because they look 
after the whole society. 
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society, a class system must and ought to function. Thus Hegel 
writes: 
A man actualizes himself only in becoming 
something definite, i.e. something specifically 
particularized: this means restricting himself 
exclusively to one of the particular spheres of 
need. In this class-system, the ethical frame 
of mind therefore is rectitude and esprit de 
corps, i.e. the disposition to make oneself a 
member of one of the moments of civil society 
by one's own aot.l 
As the system of needs develops its universa~ity, private 
property attains official recognition and protection through 
the administration of justice. Private property is now seen 
as essential for the satisfaction of universal needs and it 
becomes necessary to socially recognize the rights and respon-
sibilities of this institution. In this way, the system of 
needs passes over into the administration of justice. In the 
administration of justice, right becomes objectified, it be-
comes posited in law. This law is not designed to benefit one 
man or one group of men over another; it is designed to preserve 
order and to protect the rights of all men under its jurisdic-
tion regardless of race or group affiliation. 11A man counts 
as a man in virtue of his manhood alone, not because he is a 
J'ew, Catholic, Protestant, German (or) Italian."2 Thus, in 
civil society ttmy individua~ right, whose embodiment has 
hitherto been immediate and abstract, now similarly becomes 
1. ~., P• 133. 
2. ~., P• 134. 
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1 embodied in the existent will and knowledge of ~V.B~yone." In 
abstract right, the only rules that were recognized were de-
pended upon the arbitrary and subjective will of the parties 
involved. One might make the claim in abstract right that 
'this particular object is mine,' bowever, whether or not it 
is in fact mine depends upon whether others are willing to re-
cognize it as mine. Ndw in abstract right, there is no other 
criterion by which to decide ownership than the willingness or 
unwillingness of this other will to accept my claim. It was 
for this reason that abstract right degenerated into wrong. 
In right, the only means to dis~inguish mine from thine was 
the fact that I put my will in the object; however, there was 
nothing which could arbitrate a dispute arising when another 
individual decided to place his will in the same object at the 
same time. In abstract right there is no real authority to 
mediate disputes and the ultimate correction of wrong depends 
solely on force. If one party has the strength and the will 
to destroy a contract, the contract is destroyed. In the ad-
ministration of justice, 11 the principle of rightness becomes 
law when, in its objective existence, it is posited, i.e. when 
thinking makes it determinate for consciousness and makes it 
known as what is right and valid; anq acquiring this determin-
ate character, the right becomes positive law in general.n 2 
1. ~., p. 139. 
2. ~., pp. 134-135. 
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By being objectified in law, right becomes determined. His-
torically, we may look at this movement as a movement from 
custom to posited law. Custom is known "only in a subjective 
1 
and accidental way." Law, on the other hand, should be codi-
fied and made available for everyone to know. "If laws are to 
have a binding force, it follows ••• they must be made uni-
2 
versally known." Law is not something which springs forth 
from nothing, its seeds are to be found in the principle of 
rightness which found its subjective and accidental expression 
in custom. Hegel explains the movement in the following 
manner: 
The principle of rightness passes over in civil 
society into law. My individual right, whose em-
bodiment has hitherto been immediate and abstract, 
now similarly becomes embodied in the existent will 
and knowledge of everyone, in the sense that it 
becomes recognized. Hence, property acquisitions 
and transfers must now be undertaken and concluded 
only in the form which that embodiment gives to them. 
In civil society, property rests on contract and on 
the formalities which make ownership capable of proof 
and valid in law.3 
In law, abstract right is given content and criteria are 
posited by which an infraction may be judged. In this way, 
the administration of justice reunites the particular with the 
universal and submits the act of the particular to the test of 
universality. Because private property is recognized as an 
1. ~., p. 135. 
2. ~., p. 138. 
3. ~., p. 139. 
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essential part of the universal, a wrong done to private prop-
erty is a wrong committed against society as a whole. 
Since property and personality have legal recog-
nition and validity in civil society, wrongdoing now 
becomes an infringement, not merely of what is sub-
jevtively infinite, but of the universal thing which 
is existent with inherent stability and strength. 
Hence, a new attitude arises: the action is seen as 
a danger to society and thereby the magnitude of 
wrongdoing is increased. On the other hand, however, 
the fact that society has become strong and sure of 
itself diminishes the external importance of the in-
jury and so leads to mitigation of its punishment.! 
Thus, the idea which in civil society had previously been torn 
asunder is reunited in the administration of justice. 
In civil society, the idea is lost in particu-
larity and has fallen asunder with the separation 
of inward and outward. In the administration of 
justice, however, civil society returns to its 
concept, to the unity of the implicit universal 
with the subjective particular, although here the 
latter is only present in single cases and the 2 
universality in question is that of abstract right. 
Now, if a society had only law and the administration of 
justice, this unity would never be actualized for there would 
be no formal instrument to uphold the law or enforce the court 
decisions. The police and the corporation serve to actualize 
this unity; the police by enforcing the law and the orders of 
the court and the corporation by establishing a universal 
which the particular is able to see is in his own interest. 
However, both these instruments are limited for the unifica-
tion which the police establish is due to their power, and not 
1. Ibid., P• 140. 
2. ~., P• 145. 
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to the will of the subject, whiLe the unification established 
by the corporation is due, in part, to the will of its sub-
jects, but this unity is only partial, it excludes more than 
it includes. The right which the law embodies,- demands that 
person and property shall be safe from accidental contingen-
cies and "that the securing o£ every single person's liveli-
hood and welfare be treated and actualized as right, i.e. that 
particular welfare as such be so treated."1 The police pto-
tects the individual's right to well being. The police func-
tions as more than an agency to arrest law breakers, it takes 
an active part in seeing that the law is not broken and that 
conflicting interests do not result in a denial of rights or 
well being. The police, or as it is otherwise called, the 
public authority, serves to regulate the conflicting interests 
between producer and consumer by maintaining necessary inspec-
tions. The public authority also "takes the place of the fam-
ily where the poor are concerned in respect not only of their 
immediate want but also of laziness of disposition, malignity, 
and the other vices which arise out of their plight and sense 
2 
of wrong." In general, the primary function of the public 
authority is to 
actualize and maintain the universal contained within 
the particularity of civil society, and its control 
takes the form of an external system and organization 
1. Ibid., p. 146. 
2. ~., p. 149. 
~ . 
• for the protection and security of particular ends 
and interests ~ masse, inasmuch as these interests 
subsist only in this universal. This universal is 
immanent in the interests of particularity itself 
and, in accordance with the Idea, particularity makes 
it the end and object of its own willing and activity. 
In this way ethical principles circle back and appear 
in civil society as a factor immanent in it; this con-
stitutes the specific character of the corporation.! 
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Like the public authority, the corporation arises out of 
the needs arising in civil society. We saw that civil society 
tore the individual away from the family which had offered him 
subsistence. The individual is now forced to gain this subsis-
tence himself through the resources offered by civil society. 
The relation between the individual and civil society is dif-
ferent than the relation b~tween the individual and the fam-
ily. The activity of a family member is initiated by feelings 
of love and trust. The activity of a member of civil society 
does not have its source in benevolent feeling," but rather in 
economic necessity. In the family, the individual instinc-
tively wills the good which satisfies one of the three neces-
sary steps, willing, knowing, and doing, for actualizing, the 
good. We have seen that in civil society, interests conflict, 
the intention to do the good weakens and, thus, strict laws of 
rights and duties must be established. Whereas, in the fam-
ily, the good was always willed and sometimes done, here, it 
is sometimes willed and usually done. Because the individual 
now looks towards civil society, instead of the family, for the 
1. Ibid., P• 152 • 
........... 
,· 
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provision of his basic needs, civil society must provide the 
means for education anQ for the alleviation of material wants. 
The public authority must not only satisfy the immediate wants 
of its impoverished citizens, it must do it without increasing 
their disposition towards laziness. 1 Furthermore, in civil 
society, where the identification of the particular with the 
universal is faint and based purely on material necessity, 
poverty weakens this identity even more, forcing the individual 
to withdraw into himself and causing the destruction of his 
sense of right and wrong. As the rich become richer, and the 
poor become poorer, as the gap between the two widens and the 
members of the middle class move either up or down, a condi-
tion is created which threatens the very foundation of so-
ciety. The poor man comes to view society as existing only 
for the rich and he can see no reason to support the institu-
tion which supports his poverty. His hope lies in a change in 
the social system. At the same time, the rich, if they are 
wise and virtuous, understand:,\that charity, since it violates 
the principle of self-respect and independence, is not the 
2 
answer. The only answer to the problem of poverty is the 
1. Ibid., cf. p. 149. (Note: The condition for the development 
of this disposition is a lack of property.) 
2. Hegel does at times appear to see the struggle between rich 
and poor as a struggle between virtue and vice. However, 
it must be remembered that for Hegel, virtue is found in 
working for the universal while in vice, the individual · 
withdraws into his immediate self. Because it might be 
easier for those who are not impoverished to work for the 
universal, these people are in fact more often virtuous 
than those whose livelihood is below subsistence level. 
• 
• 
65 
creation of'work, but work increases.the amount of goods pro-
duced without increasing the number of people who consume 
these goods, and this is the problem of overproduction and 
underconsumption. Civil society is forced to expand its mar-
kets through the colonization of non-industrial areas. 
We are now forced to digress a moment to take a closer 
look at poverty and the way Hegel treats it. Hegel does not 
believe that poverty, alone, turns men into a rabble, for h~ 
writes: 
A rabble is created only when there is joined to 
poverty a disposition of mind, an inner indignation 
against the rich, against society, against the 
government. A further consequence of this attitude 
is that through their dependence on chance men become 
frivolous and idle. • • • Against nature man can 
claim no right, but once society is established, 
poverty immediately takes the form of a wrong done to 
one class by another.l 
Now, Hegel's meaning when he writes that in society 'poverty. 
takes the form of a wrong done by one class to another' is am-
biguous. Does he mean that poverty is a wrong which the rich 
perform against the poor, or does he mean that the poor see 
the rich as wronging them even if, in reality, this is not so? 
Now, the question is who, in Hegel's eyes, has taken this 
right away, the rich through their greed, or the poor through 
their laziness? When Hegel suggests that property helps man 
to actualize himself, he seems to be implying that a lack of · 
property would make a man lazy. Therefore, we might conclude 
1. ~., pp. 277-278. 
• • 
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that if the rich had monopolized all the property, they are to 
blame for the poor man's plight.. On the other hand, when he 
suggests that some men are boys with higher skills and abili-
ties than others, and that their men have a right to more 
wealth, the question arises whether they might not have a 
right to monopolize the wealth. Obviously, thes~ men do have 
the ability, and it would seem consistent to s~y that, if they 
have the ability, they also have the right, Now, the question 
is, does right mean that.which is necessary for the self-
actualization of a man, or does right mean that which·a man's 
ability allows? Now, Hegel might answer in the same manner 
that Spinoza appears to solve this problem in his Political 
Theological Treatise. The fact is, both of them would say, 
that no man has the ability to monopolize the wealth without 
placing in jeopardy the whole fabric of society and, if this 
is jeopardized, so is the wealth of any and every man in that 
' 
society. Hegel would go even further and say that any man who 
selfishly accumulates wealth without caring for the material 
well-being and the self-respect of those around him, destroys 
his own movement towards self-actualization. 
We have noticed that Hegel makes a distinction between the 
attitude of a poor man existing on charity and the poor man 
who is allowed to work. He finds. that the former will be lazy 
while the latter will be able to maintain his self-respect. 
However, there is another distinction which Hegel fails to 
make and this is the distinction between the above cases and 
• 
• 
• 
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the poor man who works, does not receive charity and remains 
throughout his labor despicably poor. It is mainly with this 
man that Marx was concerned. This man might be anything but 
lazy and idle, he might become fanatical, actively radical and 
revolutionary. While the former might be able to identify him-
self with the rich because he lives off their charity, the 
latter can find no such identification, for it is the rich 
which live off t~. his (in the form of labor), and he can ill 
afford to give. Hegel attempts to solve the problem of poverty 
by expanding markets and colonization and as a matter of fact, 
Marx used these same instruments to solve the problem of pov-
erty, only for him, this does not really solve the problem, 
but rather prolongs it. 1 Perhaps the difference between Marx 
and Hegel is that Marx does not believe that the poor man 
stands against society, he only stands against the society 
which exists, while. to Hegel, this is 'the society', and only 
through developing this society may the state emerge. Through 
the state, man is actualized. For Marx, man's ultimate de-
velopment depends upon transcending the existing state. 
For Hegel, it is the corporation which alleviates the 
pains of poverty. The family was the first ethical root of 
the state, the corporation is the second. 2 In both units, the 
1. C.F. Lewis S. Feuer, Mar~ and Engels, Basic Writings on 
Politics and Philosophy (Garden City, New York: Anchor, 
1959), p. 13 • 
2. ~., p. 154. 
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individual desires the welfare of the whole and the whole de-
sires the welfare of the individual. In civil society, a di-
remption existed between the satisfaction of need and the pro-
tection of right. ~he law, in trying a criminal saw no need 
to take into account the fact that a theft might have been 
committed out of hunger and need. A man might have a right to 
be fed, but that right do~s not make him any less hungry when 
he can find no food. "In the corporation these moments are 
I 
united in an inward fashion, so that in this union particular 
welfare is present as a right and is actualized."1 In the 
system of needs, the individual was not fully aware 11 of the 
universal which regulates his activity. 112 On the other hand, 
"the universal purpose of the corporation is, at the same 
time, the particular purpose of its members. 113 
The difference betw·een the Corporation and the State is 
that the purpose of the Corporation, though universal 
for i t·s members, in the sense that it is the same for 
all of them, is still restricted; it is not the purpose 
of all members of society but that of a section only.4 
Because the corporation has some of the characteristics of 
1. ~·, P• 154. 
2. ~., p. 362 (T.N.). 
3. Ibid., p. 362 ( T .N.). 
4. ~., p. 362 (T.N.). However, there is a question whether 
or not this is the only difference, for it it were, the re-
lationship between states and that between corporations 
would be the same. However, there would seem to be another 
difference, for while the state is able to mediate disputes 
between corporations, there is nothing but history above 
the state. 
• 
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the family and because the welfare of each part is essential 
to the welfare of the whole, "the help which poverty receives 
loses its accidental character and the humiliation wrongfully 
associated with it •111 The reciprocal relationship betw·een the 
member and the corporation consists in this: that, when the 
needs of a member are satisfied, the whole is strengthened 
and, when the whole is strengthened, the needs of its members 
are satisfied. The corporation forces the long range view, it 
requires that immediate desires be subservient to the long 
range goal of economic stability. The division of wealt.h no 
longer forces one individual to lose his self-respect by de-
pending on another, for each member has a right to a portion 
of the wealth. "In the corporation, the family has its stable 
basis in the sense that its livelihood is assured there, con-
ditioned upon capability, i.e. it has a stable capital. 112 
Nevertheless, 11 the end of the corporation is particular and 
finite. 113 The corporation does not yet have the state as its 
end and goal. It is true that the corporation is a strong 
force serving to bind the particular members to one another 
and serving to bind the particular with the whole; however, it 
is also true that the corporation and its members depend for 
their well-'being and spiritual development upon the stability 
1. Ibid., p. 174. 
2. ~., p. 153 • 
3. ~., p. 154. 
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and welfare of certain institutions which are not included 
within the immediate body of the corporation and towards whose 
goals the activity of the corporation is not consciously di-
rected. While the corporation provides the stable base and 
required capital for its members to sustain themselves, it, as 
a single unit, does not direct its energy towards caring for 
the state. 
Civil society is the embodiment of the economic will and 
is governed by law; the state is the embodiment of the ethical 
will and differs from civil society by the fact that not only 
is it governed by law but it, itself, is developed through a 
consciousness of the law and an awareness that the law is just 
and good. In civil society, the action of the individual and 
the corporation axe controlled by the universal but they, 
themselves, do not work for that universal. The state is an 
infinite universal because it is independent, self-related and 
self-sufficient, the corporation is a finite universal for 
while it is self-related, it is not independent nor self-
' 
sufficient. Thus, while civil society concentrates its at-
tention upon the particular, and the corporation concentrates 
its upon the finite universal, the state, which inc.ludes its 
members, concentrates upon the universal will. 
Transition to the State 
The state realizes the truth of the family and of civil 
society. It cultivates that feeling of love and benevolence 
found in the family and directs it towards the larger whole 
• 
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which is developed through the interrelation of the members of 
civil society and the corporation. In the state, the destruc-
tive competitive elements which are found in civil society, 
are controlled and directed towards the benefit of the 
. 1 1 un1versa • They are controlled by an individual consciousness 
which understands that the interests of the universal are far 
more important to him than any immediate desire for self-
aggrandizement. As Hegel explains, the highest and absolute 
end of the state "is that personal subjectivity which knows 
and wills this concrete universality as its own objective 
value. 112 
The corporation is limited by those institutions which 
exist outside of it, the public ~uthority, the religious in-
stitutions, etc., while at the same time, these institutions 
which are outside of the corporation are limited by it and 
thus both have elements of finitude. Nevertheless, definite 
relationships do exist between these institutions, relation-
ships which are essential to each but which~ as of yet, have 
not been recognized. For example, the corporation depends up-
on the public authority for the preservation of order, while 
the public authority depends upon the corporation for material 
goods. Similarly, the corporation depends on non-members for 
its markets while these non-members depend upon it for their 
1. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 172 • 
2. Hegel, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, p. 253". 
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goods. All of these institutions find their truth and their 
unity in the state. Their truth, because the 'state recognizes 
that these institutions are essentially related to one another; 
their unity, because once the essential relationship becomes 
recognized then fundamental antagonisms are removed and the 
existence of one institution is not seen as external to, or 
unimportant for the existence of another. 
The movement is not to be considered a movement which re-
sults in the state, for the concept of the state was present 
all the time, both in the family and in civil society. If 
this were not the case, then these institutions would have 
been able to stand alone, they would not have needed anything 
else for their completion and would have been infinite univer-
sals. But by themselves, they are not self-sufficient or in-
dependent. Hegel writes that: 
Actually • • • the state as such is not so much the 
result as the beginning. It is within the state 
that the family is first developed into civil society, 
and it is the idea of the state itself which disrupts 
itself into these two moments.l 
Both the family and civil society proved to be limited in 
their truth. The family was finite because it could not re-
main an independent unit; it was limited. Once its necessary 
growth began, it was forced to associate itself with other 
units outside of the immediate family. The family passed into 
civil society and the laws of civil society served to protect 
1. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, p. 155. 
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the rights of her isolated members. However, civil society 
failed to provide for the well-being of its citizens and was 
forced to modify its structure through the introduction of the 
public authority and the corporation. But both of these 
proved to be limited and we were forced to pass on to the 
state. Thus it is that the idea of the state exists within 
each one of these phases and each one of these phases chooses 
to emphasize a different aspect of this idea, but not one of 
these aspects emphasized can stand alone until the whole idea 
is completed. The state develops the concept of love found in 
the family and completes it by providing the means whereby the 
individual not only wills the good for his family, he is also 
able to know the good and to ~ the good. Furthermore, it 
takes this concept of love and completes its object, for 
whereas the completion of the family is found in the state, 
the completion of love is found in patriotism for the state. 
The law of civil society is now consciously seen to be essen-
tial to the welfare which the corporation emphasized and this 
welfare is no longer airected merely towards its particular 
and finite interests but is now focused upon the universal 
welfare, or the interests of the state. The state is the be-
ginning of the movement for it is the actualizing of the ideas 
which existed since the beginning. "The state is the actual-
ity of the ethical idea. 111 It has the power to incorporate 
1. ~., p. 155. 
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the ideas of other stages of the movement and to embody them 
in institutions.· Like morality, it has universality as its 
ob-ject, but unlike morality its universal is not empty and 
abstract, it is actual and content-full. The state has the 
power to actualize the universal, it does not ignore the 
materials with which it has to work,,rather it takes full ad-
vantage of these materials reforming them to suit its purpose 
and idea. In this way, the state accomplishes what it knows 
to be good. 
Because the state is "the actuality of the substantial 
will, 111 (that without which all else would fall apart), it is 
absolutely rational. This does not mean that there is no 
higher stage than the particular state, for Hegel admits that 
there is, but it does mean that that which sustains the lower 
stages and develops the truth in them must be looked upon as 
rational. The state binds together what the understanding 
tears apart. It sees-the essential relationship of one part 
for another and achieves their union. The state objectifies 
"the truth ••• veiled behind subjective ideas and feelings." 
It actualizes that truth which lies hidden behind the wall of 
immediate feeling and whimsical acts. Because the state is 
rational, because it is truth and substance of the individual, 
his real will objectified, the state "has supreme right 
against the individual, whose supreme duty is to be a member 
1. Ibid., p. 155. 
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of the state. 111 
The role of property in the transition from civil society 
to the state.-- Civil society, designed for the protection of 
private property, also serves an educational function, a func-
tion arising out of private property and leading to the state. 
As the interdependence between the members of civil society is 
increased and the efficiency in producing goods rises, trade 
and commerce must be developed to lessen the malignant effects 
of overproduction. These institutions also demand private 
property and capital to perfo~m their function. In order to 
protect the capital invested and the resulting and necessary 
institutions of trade and commerce, laws are required. These 
laws are not the institutionalized embodiment of a capricious 
will which changes from moment to moment. They are the product 
of reason, and through their creation, man comes to realize 
that he has a universal side. Man is now able to will the 
universal without restricting his freedom. As T. M. Kno~ 
writes in his foreword to the Philosophy of Right: 
So long as men regard freedom as freedom to pursue 
selfish whims, society is possible only if external 
checks are placed on this freedom; government is 
then an external organization to meet men's neces-
sities. But if they realize that their true freedom 
consists in the acceptance of principles, of laws 
which are their o,vn, a synthesis of universal and 
particular interests becomes possible. It can be 
actualized, however, only in and through the poli-
tical institutions whereby the st~te proper is 
distinguished from civil society. 
1. ~., p. 155. 
2. ~., p. XI. Translator's foreword (T. N.) 
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W'hen men come to understand that the cleavage between the uni-
versal and the particular, between their wealth and the laws 
and institutions of society is only apparent, "when they re-
alize the concrete unity of universal and particular in their 
own nature, 111 then the organic whole of the state is able to 
find its actuality. Thus, private property is essential for 
the establishment of the state and its rights must be pro-
tected by law. But these rights must not allow the owner of 
property to run wild under the control of only their strongest 
momentary desire. Private property must be controlled and 
with this control, man finds his freedom and the state its ac-
tuality. The control placed on private property limits only 
man's abstract freedom, not his concrete freedom. 
The role of capital in the movement from the family to 
civil society and from civil society to the state.-- Hegel 
does not state with absolute clarity his intention when using 
the word capital, however, there are a number of fragmentary 
statements from which we may attempt to draw some kind of con-
elusion as to his meaning and then, perhaps we may continue 
from there. In his section on the family, Hegel speaks of 
capital as being permanent and secure possession. 2 He also 
writes that the capital of the family, secured by the husbands 
going out and working for a living, "is common property." 3 
1. Ibid o, p o XI o ( T. No) 
-
2o ~o' po 116o 
3. ~0, p. 116. 
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However, it is not yet clear whether all capital is to be seen 
as common property, or just the capital of the family. When 
Hegel speaks of civil society, the notion of capital as common 
property is dropped. For when he writes that one man's re-
sources should not be equal to that of every other man, he al-
so writes that nA particular man's resources, or in other 
words his opportunity of sharing in the general resources, are 
conditioned, ••• partly by his own unearned principal (his 
capital), and partly by his skill."l Thus, individual capital 
in civil society is not common property, and not equal. Now 
Hegel speaks of capital in this quotation as unearned prin-
cipal, but we must not think that the only kind of thing which 
he recognizes as capital is unearned. The advantages which a 
man has upon entering civil society and engaging in the busi-
ness of making a living is determined by the principal he has 
upon entering, given through inheritance, or some other means, 
but this is not to say that all principal is unearned. Nor is 
it sufficient to say that capital is principal, for if this is 
all that capital is, then we have just given it another name 
and we are still left with the task of discovering what capi-
tal, or principal is. On the other hand, if we admit that 
principal is but one kind of capital, then we must state what 
the other kinds are, and what the similarity between them is. 
Now Hegel speaks of private capital, but at the same time, he 
1. ~., p. 130. 
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also speaks of public capital, for he writes that "the uni-
versal per~anent capital • . . gives each the opportunity • . . 
to draw a share from it. 111 We have not found any clear state-
ment of the nature of capital, but we can, from the foregoing, 
draw some conclusions. First of all, we have noted that capi-
tal must be somewhat permanent and secure. For that reason, 
such things as the food which is used for our own private con-
sumption cannot be called capital. We have also seen that 
capital may be either earned (as the husband who goes out to 
work), or unearned (the son who enters civil society with some 
beginning capital). Capital, even though somew·hat permanent, 
is not to be thought of as a stagnant or changeless thing, for 
Hegel does speak of the public capital increasing through the 
individual contributions. Probably, Hegel's most persistent 
use of the word 'capital' has been as wealth which further 
conditions, the amount of wealth an individual or a society is 
able to obtain. In this, rather broad use of the word, we 
must look upon not only material resources as capital, but al-
so any other permanent possession such as education or skill. 
Thus, we find a reciprocal relationship between the in-
dividual's capital, and the general capital. The more capital 
an individual has, the more he is able to participate in the 
general capital, and the more he is able to participate in the 
general capital, the more individual capital is he able to 
1. ~-' p. 130. 
accumulate. On the other hand, we are to count as a part of 
the general capital, the individual capital of its members, 
for by directing the individual capital towards the general 
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capital, we not only increase the individual capital, we also 
increase the general capital. There are, however, a number of 
qualifications to this relationship; first of all, not all 
skill is to be considered as capital to be enjoyed by its pos-
sessor. The skill of the slave cannot yet be said to be his 
capital, for he is not the one who profits from this skill. 1 
Nor, should we consider the relationship between private and 
public capital always equally binding for there are many cases 
where a man will increase his private capital by methods which 
will, in the long run decrease the public capital (e.g. the 
farmer who destroys the land by growing high value crops). 
Nowever, in these cases, in the long run, private capital (in-
cluding the farmer's unless he dies or leaves town before the 
fall) will also decrease. This reciprocal relationship be-
tween private and public capital should be seen as the first 
positive step in the movement of civil society which has its 
end in the state. 2 
In the family, we saw that capital first gave the family 
its objective embodiment through care for a common possession. 
1. There are some further qualifications to this remark, but 
these will be discussed in a later section. 
2. That is, if we may speak of positive and negative with any 
meaning. 
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On the other hand, the family capital provided for the educa-
tion of the children and this education enabled them to become 
persons in their own right and able to have families of their 
own. 
The ethical dissolution of the family consists 
in this, that once the children have been educated 
to freedom of personality, and have come of age, 
they become recognized as persons in the eyes of the 
law and capable of holding free property of their 
own and founding families of their own, the sons as 
heads of new families, the daughters as wives.l 
Thus, we find a plurality of families and the movement into 
civil society. 
In civil society, the fact that men have quantitatively 
unequal amounts of capital leads to an unequal distribution of 
wealth, and this results in the need for corporations in order 
to provide work for the poor and markets for goods. Since the 
internal ethical unity of the corporation depends upon other 
bodies, which are outside of itself, this movement leads to 
the state. Also, in civil society, we find qualitatively dif-
ferent kinds of capital; we find the capital of the farmer 
(w·hich, along with marriage is the first element in the de-
velopment of the state2) and the capital of the business man. 
This qualitative difference of capital is to be seen as the 
initiating c-ause of the class system and of the interdepend-
ence of classes, an interdependence which the state explicates 
and unifies. Both this quantitative and qualitative 
1. lQid., p. 118. 
2. ~., p. 131. 
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difference requires the establishment of the class of civil 
servants. This is the universal class, having the universal 
interests of the community as its goal and it is this class 
which establishes the first explicit link with the universal. 
The State 
The state, itself, exhibits a movement which ends in the 
subordination of individual states, existing at particular 
times, to the general movement of history. This isolated uni-
ty becomes related to other individual states in the sphere of 
international law, but this unity is only apparent and is torn 
apart. The state then finds its truth in the movement of 
world history. 
The state finds its actuality through the will and the ac-
tivity of its individual member. However, the state serves to 
coordinate individual goals and to give them each a common and 
a universal end. Hegel writes that: 
The state is the actuality of concrete freedom. 
But concrete freedom consists in this, that personal 
individuality and its particular interests not only 
achieve their complete development and gain explicit 
recognition for their right (as they do in the sphere 
of the family and civil society) but, for one thing, 
they also pass over of their own accord into the in-
terests of the universal.l 
In the state, the par~s and the whole act in harmony with each 
other thus making the whole greater than the sum of its parts. 
Of course, there are bodies which are called states in which 
1. ~-' p. 160. 
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the parts ~o not always act in harmony with each· other and in 
which the whole and the parts sometimes stand against each 
other, but this fact is incidental to what a state can and 
should be. In so far as a body fails to meet this standard, 
it may be called a bad state, or less of a state than one 
which does realize the standard. However, the only safe way 
to tell whether a state is a state is through the movement of 
history and this is only an after-the-fact analysis. 
\Vhile the state desires its own well-being, this wefl-
being is not something separate from the well-being of its 
parts. The interests of the family and of civil. society are 
dependent upon and subordinate to the state. However, since 
both the family and civil society depend upon the state for 
the dondi~ions which will allow them to achieve their goals, 
we cannot say ~hat the goals of the family or of civil society 
are ·antagonistic to those of the state. Of course, the state 
must act to correct the wrongdoing of one of its parts and 
such correction might demand the punishment, or even the an-
nihilation of that part. However, one might say that in so 
far as a part .acts to destroy the whole it is not yet a real 
part of the state and the state in correcting this alien ele-
ment is correcting something which is only implicitly a part 
of itself. It is treating this element as the action of the 
element demands that it be treated, it is treated as something 
outside of the state. The state, in keeping with its in-
finity, must act to keep its parts within itself. Therefore, 
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for it to allow an individual or an organization to completely 
deny its widest goals and basic principles is to allow that 
part to limit the state and a limited state is not infinite; 
it is, in fact, not a state, but rather civil society. 
The state acts to organize the various diverse elements 
found in civil society and to give these elements form. The 
state, itself, is nothing more than the concrete form which it 
( 
gives to these elements. The constitution, or the basic uni-
versal principle of the state is the first basis of organiza-
tion. No matter how diverse the parts, nor how varied the 
interests, all those who are members of the state adhere to 
the basic principles found in its constitution. The constitu-
tion, be it written or unwritten, organizes the elements of 
the state such as the family, civil society, and the corpora-
tion into a common unity. Hegel,describes the constitution as: 
the organization of the state and the self-related 
process of its organic life, a process whereby it 
differentiates its moments within itself and de-
velops them to self-subsistence.! 
On its internal side the constitution is divided into 
three main parts, the crown, the executive, and the legisla-
ture. The legislature has the power 11 to determine and estab-
lish the universal, 112 the power to make the law. The 
executive has "the power to subsume single cases and the 
1. ~., p. 174. 
2. ~., p. 176 
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spheres of particularity under the universal. 111 It has the 
power to apply the law· to particular cases. The consti tu-
tional monarch has 11 the power of subjectivity. 112 The crown is 
the ultimate point of responsibility. It unifies the legisla-
tive and the executive branches of government, or the universal 
and the particular. Without this center of authority, power, 
responsibility and authority would be divided and this divi-
sion would mean that the ruling bodies of the state would be 
external to one another. In such a situation, there would not 
be unity; the state with two centers of power is not an inter-
nally related body, but two ~xternally related bodies. This 
type of state is no state at all for the concept of the state 
is infinitude and a body which is divided within itself, with 
each part vying for power is not infinite; it is finite. 
The monarch is to be completely committed to the state. 
He does not represent an interest apart from and different 
than that of the state. "The development of the state to con-
stitutional monarchy" Hegel sees as "the achievement of the 
modern world.u 3 In other t-imes, monarchs existed, but, all 
too often, they reigned not in the interest of the state, or 
even of their subjects, their office served their own inter-
est and this interest was narrow and selfish. A constitutional 
1. ~-' p. 176. 
2. ~., p. 176. 
3. ~., p. 176. 
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monarch, on the other hand, acts within the boundaries set up 
by the constitution or the organization of the state. The 
freedom of the monarch is not arbitrary or abstract; it is 
meaningfully determined and directed and through the actuali-
zation of his freedom that of his subjects is also actualized 
(the relationship also works in reverse). His freedom is di-
rected by the constitution and determined by his commitments, 
the state, and the development of its institutions and citi-
zens. 
The state has the final .say in matters of good and bad, 
right or wrong. Beyond the state, the individual has no ap-
peal. However, Hegel writes that by no stretch of the imagi-
nation does this mean 
that the monarch may act capriciously. As a matter 
of fact, he is bound by the concrete decisions of 
his counsellors, and if the censtitution is stable, 
he has often no more to do than sign his ,name. But 
this name is important. It is the last word beyond 
which it is impossible to go.l 
The constitution mediates between ruler and ruled. The ruler 
may no longer act from caprice or from his own momentary in-
terests; he must act within the limits set by the constitution 
and he must act for the universal. In acting for the uni-
versal, the ruler acts to stabalize the order which is nec-
essary for the particular to function. On the other hand, the 
1. Ibid., p. 288. Hegel tries to remove the position of 
monarch from the strife and conflicting interests of 
society by making his right to the throne one of birth 
and not of political manoeuvring. 
.·• 
, .. 
• particular individual no longer sees the ruler as standing 
against him, but rather he understands that the ruler limits 
i 
his own actions in accord with the universal. Since the in~ 
4ividual now sees the interests of the universal as the sub-
stantial basis for his own interests, he is aware that the 
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ruler in acting for the universal is also acting for him as a 
particular. Since the individual now does see the interests 
of the uniYersal as the foundation of his own activity, he 
sees both the monarch and the constitution as existing for 
himself, wanting what he wants and creating the conditions 
which allow these wants to be actualized. This is the creation 
of a stable, efficient and orderly state which views its par-
ticular citizen as a part of itself. 
The institutions of the state have their existence because 
of their universal qualities and function as objective judges, 
executors or legislators of the universal. The interest of 
these institutions is directed towards the universal and their 
job is to subsume the particular under that universal. For 
this reason, the persons who occupy these positions do not oc-
cupy them through any privilege of wealth or size of personal 
property holdings. The people who hold these positions hold 
them because of their ability to objectively judge the in-
terests of the ·universal and there is no reason to assume that 
the wealthier a man is, the better judge he makes. The power 
of the state is not based on private property but rather on 
other, more universal foundations. In fact, the security and 
0 
0 
0 
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stability of private property depends upon the state. 11 This 
is the secret of the patriotism·of the citizens in the sense 
that they know the state as their substance, because it is the 
state that maintains their particular spheres of interest. 111 
But even more than coming to understand that the state is 
the sustaining force behind his individual and more immediate 
interests, behind his wealth and property, a person comes to 
understand that only through the state does he acquire a con-
crete existence, an existence which requires a determined and 
meaningful course of action and an ethical basis for his acts. 
Only in the state can the feeling found in the family and the 
economic necessities of the particular in civil society be 
united with each other and only when they are united is the 
individual able to actualize himself by realizing his highest 
potential. As Marcuse explains, "the individual can hope to 
fulfill himself only if he is a free member of a real 
community. 112 
Hegel conceives of the middle class as the pillar of the 
state. it is likely that he sees the lower class as being too 
involved with immediate-need satisfaction to have a strong 
political consciousness and sense of social obligation, and 
the aristocrats as being too far removed from the everyday 
cares of life to be able to understand the hardships in 
1. Ibid., pp. 188-189. 
2. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 89. 
,· 
0 
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sustaining the individual parts which are vital to the main-
tenance of the whole. Hegel writes that: 
The middle class to which civil servants belong, 
is politically conscious and one in which education 
is most prominent. For this reason it is also the 
pillar of the state so far as honesty and intelli-
gence are concerned. A state without a middle class 
must therefore remain on a low level. Russia, for 
instance, has a mass of serfs on the one hand and a 
mass of rulers on the other. It is a prime concern 
of the state that a middle class should be developed, 
but this can be done only if the state is an organic 
unity like the one described here.l 
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Hegel believes that the middle class is the class in which "the 
consciousness of right and the developed intelligence of the 
mass of people is found." 2 The reasons for these virtues are 
not explicitly stated, but they might be connected to the in-
stitutions of trade and commerce, and to private property, the 
institution which was so important in the development of 
right. However, it is not yet certain what the consequences 
of Hegel's evaluation of the middle class entail. Either he 
is saying that all members of the state should be members of 
this class, and thus, the entire population will come to see 
that the state exists for them and they will develop that 
sense of right which is the mark of the middle class;_or, he 
is saying that only the members of the middle class, which is 
one class among others, are able to develop this social con-
sciousness and sense of right. If we take the first meaning, 
1. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 291. 
2. ~., P• 193. 
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then Hegel appears to be back in the realm of morality, advo-
cating an impossible ought. If, on the other hand, we take 
, the second meaning, then it is questionable whether we really 
have a state, for if only the middle class is able to develop 
the social attitudes consistent with statehood, then it would 
seem that the middle class would be limited by the attitudes 
of those who are not members of it, and in so far as it is 
limited, then we may conclude that the state is limited. And 
again, in so far as the state is limited by something which 
should be, but is not yet a part of it, then it is not fully a 
state. There is, perhaps, one way in which Hegel could dull 
the sharpness of this criticism and that is by reminding us of 
the distinction between property and capital and the distinc-
tion between the attitudes of the person who just holds a 
minimum of property and the person who also holds capital. 
This is the distinction between that which belongs to me as an 
objectification of my personality and as such has particular 
value, and that which, while it may belong to me, has, at the 
same time, universal value and is able to actualize my person-
ality only in so far as I use this object in accord with its 
I 
universal end. While private property gives immediate, or 
personal enjoyment, capital must be used to increase both the 
particular and the universal wealth. Property has a value in 
itself, whereas the value of capital is measured only by its 
capacity to increase the universal wealth by producing more 
goods for the market. Hegel might argue that all members of 
• 
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all classes require property and the £act that they have prop-
erty conditions an attitude which is not antagonistic to the 
state. However, it is in the middle class in which we find 
capital. Now, since the value of capital is only actualized 
as it is used to increase the universal wealth, the private 
interests of the middle class demand more than a mere passive 
acceptance of the state, they demand that the individual ac-
tively engage himsel£ in working for the universal. For this 
reason, the member of the middle class is able to see more 
easily his dependence upon the state and with this insight, 
consciously finds it to be to his advantage to work for the 
state. We might object that the labor of the lower class has 
universal value and therefore ought to be seen as capital. 
Yet the difference is that an increase in labor does not nee-
essarily mean an increase in public wealth (as when man is re-
placed by machine) and more often than not, an increase in 
labor ~eans a decreaae in personal welfare; while this is not 
true wi~h other types of capital wealth. Furthermore, an in-
' 
crease in labor gives a man less time to engage in other ac-
tivities, such as education or political activity. An 
increase in other kinds of capital does not necessarily have 
this effect, as,a matter of fact, it often gives a man more 
leisure with which he may engage in these activities. 
However, both labor and capital may take the form of money 
and, if large enough, this may allow a member of the lower 
0 
0 
0 
class to enter the middle class and become an active and in-
terested memb.er in the affairs of the state. Hegel explains 
the value of money for subjective freedom in this manner: 
In Plato's Republic, the guardians are left 
to allot individuals to their particular classes 
and impose on them their particular tasks • • • • 
In these circumstances the principle of sub-
jective freedom is lacking, i.e. the principle 
that the individual's substantive activity ••• 
shall be mediated through his particular volition. 
This is a right which can be secured only when the 
demand for service takes the form of a demand for 
something of universal value, and it is this right 
which has brought with it this conversion of the 
state's demands into demands for cash.l 
91 
, - In this case, the fact that the state is able to demand money 
from its citizens, rather than a particular task, relieves the 
citizen from being arbitrarily and forcefully chosen to perform 
a necessary task and it also relieves him from the rigid 
social status which goes along with this assignment. The 
reason the state is able to avoid this type of imposition on 
its citizen is that money represents the universal form of 
wealth, and applies to things which have a value beyond a mere 
personal value~ It serves to translate qualitative values in-
to quantitative ones, thus providing a fair means of exchange. 
In thi-s--way, the- sta-te- is able to call upon the .services of 
one who desires to perform the task required, either because 
he enjoys the work, or desires the money. Hegel explains the 
value and func-tion of money by writing that: 
MQney is not one particular type of wealth amongst 
1. ~., P• 195. 
others, but the universal form of all types so far 
as they are expressed in an external embodiment, 
and so can be taken as 'things'. Only by being 
translated into terms of this extreme culmination 
of externality can services exacted by the state 
be fixed quantitatively and so justly and equitably. 1 
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Money represents a means whereby the legislature is able to 
fix·with fairness and determine with accuracy the services due 
the state by its individual citizens. This would suggest that 
tax laws ought to be instituted only after carefully consider-
ing the amount of money a man is able to pay. Whether this 
implies a tax which takes an equal percentage of each man's 
income, or one which the percentage of tax increases as income 
increases is left unanswered by Hegel. However, any argument 
on this subject would have to take the ability of a poor man 
and a rich man to pay taxes into consideration. 
The legislature gives form and order to the estates of the 
realm. Without such form, these social classes are nothing 
but chaotic destructive elements operating to hinder the order 
and function of society. With this form, the estates serve 
"as a. mediating organ," standing "between the government in 
general, on the one hand, and the nation broken up into par-
ticulars (people and associations) on the other."2 The es-
tates prevent the powers of government from forgetting the 
particular needs and interests of the citizens and they order 
the particular interests of their members. By bringing the 
1 • .!:2.!1·' pp. ·194-195. 
2 • .ill!·' p. 197. 
individual elements into the organization of the state, they 
prevent those elements from "crystallizing into a powerful 
block in opposition to the organized state."1 
Because the state is aware of its existence as a unit in 
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sharp distinction from other units, or other states, it is an 
individual. The relation between states limits ~he infinity 
of any particular state, but taken as an entire process, these 
relations pass into a higher, more conclusive infinity, the 
movem~nt of history, or the world spirit. The meaning of the 
phrase, 'the state is aware of its existence as a unit' may 
best be exemplified by an analogy. A person may be said to oe 
aware of himself as a unit, however, neither the unity, nor 
the awareness (or for that matter, the person) is present when 
each cell has a separate, isolated and independent existence. 
It is only when the cells are arranged as a unity, acting to-
gether for the whole that it can be aware of itself as a unit, 
but it is not the individual cells which are so aware, but 
rather the unit itself. Now, only when the institutions and 
organizations of the state start working together for a common 
purpose do they form an (actual) unity, a state. Now, this 
unit not only acts, it acts with a purpose, for its own goals. 
Now, to act with a purpose, for oneself, suggests an awareness 
of the existence of the self and of the goals which our purpose 
maintains. Even though no one individual is completely 
l. ~., p. 197. 
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conscious of this unity and all its aspects, these individuals, 
taken together, as a state, are as aware of their own total 
unity as any one of them {as a unity of cells) is of his indi~ 
I 
vidual unity. Certainly, a state seen from the perspective 
of another state, appears to act with a conscious awareness of 
its own strengths and weaknesses (although it might misjudge 
them) and one may even predict, with a fair amouht of accuracy, 
how this state might react to insult or praise. 
Since the state is the substance of its individual members, 
allowing those members to actualize themselves, the citizen is 
obliged to come to the aid of the state when it is threatened. 
The fact of the matter is that, whether the individual does or 
does not come to the aid of the state, his life and property 
are in danger. But if the entire population is possessed by 
this selfish attitude, then the state, not only as an abstract 
entity, but the state, in all its concreteness would be over-
run. The state and all its citizens would be defeated. If, 
on the other hand, the state is able, through the effort of 
the majority of its citizens, to stave off a threat or an at-
tack, then the citizen, who fails to contribute to the common 
effort, denies his own actuality and the highest purposes 
which gives concreteness to his freedom. If, however, it hap-
pens that a citi~en gives up his life in fighting for the 
state, we are not to consider this act as final; true, his 
life is destroyed and his wealth and property become meaning-
less, but that larger whole for which he was created continues 
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to manifest his spirit and his highe~t aspirations. For this 
reason, the supreme goal of the state is not to be seen as the 
protection of life and property; this is the task of but one 
part of the state, civil society. As a matter o£ fact, the 
state serves to minimize, or at least to place in its proper 
perspective, the importance of life and property. Hegel 
writes that: 
War is the state of affairs which deals 
in earnest with the vanity of temporal goods 
and concerns •••• War has the higher sig-
nificance that by its agency ••• 'the ethical 
health of its people is preserved in their in-
difference to the stability of finite institutions; 
just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea 
from the foulness which would be the result of a 
prolonged calm, so also corruption in nations 
would be the product of prolonged, let alone 
'perpetual', peace.'l 
War pulls people together, makes them forget their selfish 
aims and directs them to act as and for the whole. The acci-
dental appearance turns out to be a neces~ity for the movement 
of the world spirit and for the ethical life of the state. 
"To be sure, war produces insecurity of property, but this in-
security of things is nothing but their transience which is 
inevitable."2 Hegel does not seem to value war in and for it-
self, but only in so far as it is required for the movement of 
world history and for the ethical life of the state. However, 
in so far as he sees war as essential to these ends, we must 
1. ~., p. 210. 
2. ~., p. 295. 
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admit that it cannot be completely separated from them. 
In the course of these relations between s~ates, interna-
tional law arises as an attempt to create a standard by which 
to judge the actions of any particular state. Because this 
law attempts to judge autonomous units, it is doomed to remain 
an ought to be, a principle without power. As soon as one 
state feels that its interests are not served by following 
this law, it will break it. The power to enforce interna-
tional law resides in the individual states, and they will 
only enforce it when it suits their interests to do so. Thus, 
Hegel, like Hobbes bef6re him, concludes that serious disputes 
between nations can be settled only by war. 
The state, in relation to its parts was regarded as infi-
nite, but now we see that the infinity of any one particular 
state is restricted by other states. "The autonomy of the 
state is exposed to contingency."! They depend for their au-
tonomy upon their relation with other similar units. These 
relationships are the stuff of history, and history supersedes 
the infinity of any particular state. VThere international law 
could not judge, world history must. History tells us of the 
success or failure of a particular idea of a particular state 
in conflict with another state and another idea. The result-
ing synthesis will, given faith and time, incorporate the 
truth of both. This does not mean that the verdict of world 
1. ~., p. 215. 
histery is a decision based merely upon power: 
On the contrary, since mind is implicitly and 
actually reason, and reason is explicit to 
itself in mind as knowledge, world history is 
the necessary development, out of the concept 
of mind's freedom alone, of the moments of 
reason and so of the self-consciousness and 
freedom of mind. This development is the inter-
pretation and actualization ef mind.l 
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Given these considerations, it would seem that we, as indivi-
' duals, could never completely judge the truth ef an ethical 
idea until that idea is established. All that we are able to 
do is to recognize the meaning and order which the state gives 
to our lives and to respect and, if necessary, fight for its 
idea. There is at least one serious point of contention in 
this whole analysis and that is this. In all other cases, 
where one particular was limited by and related to another 
particular, Hegel was willing to admit that there comes a 
point where the particular will recognize this relationship 
and will enter into harmonious relations of some kind or 
other. This happened in the movement from civil society to 
the corporation and in the movement from the corporation to 
the state. However, when he discusses individual states, he 
fails to admit that this same process might take place. Cer-
tainly, man in civil society had as much power in relation to 
his fellow men as one state has in relation to another and his 
infinity was proportionate to his relation to other units of 
the same ~im~, no more restricted than the infinity of one 
' ~ 
1. ~., p. 216. 
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state in relation to another. We might say that if states 
were as wise as people they would come to realize thses limi-
tations and correct them. Now, Hegel might answer that, even 
in the transition from civil society to the corporation and 
from the corporation to the state, there was no one individual 
which was aware of this unity in all its aspects. The harmony 
established by these higher institutions created the condition 
for each member to understand that such a harmony existed, but 
the complete awareness of what this harmony means, of the con-
tent of this harmony, is not available to any one individual. 
It is only the corporation, or the state which is completely 
aware, not only of the fact that it is a unity, but also of 
wha~ this unity is. By the same token, each state is aware of 
the fact that it is in relationship with every other state, 
but it is not aware of what these relationships mean, or what 
results they will bring. Only world history is aware of the 
complete content of these relationships. The spirit of the 
world is reason for it places into a meaningful whole these 
states which are in such seemingly chaotic relationships with 
each other. From the point of view of world history, there is 
a definite development among states, there is a movement to-
wards harmony and order within states and towards a more com-
plete unity between form.and content, universal and particular. 
As mind moves closer towards these goals, it strives harder 
for them and in this sense we must say that mind is becoming 
increasingly aware of itself. For as Hegel writes: 
• 
The history of mind is its own act. Mind is 
only what it does, and its act is to make itself 
the object of its own consciousness. In history 
its act is to gain consciousness of itself as 
mind, to appreciate itself in its interpretation 
of itself to itself.l 
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And, while the particular citizen and state is moved merely by 
their own self-interest, "they are all the time the unconscious 
tools and organs of the world mind at work withi~ them.~2 
1. ~., p. 216 • 
2. ~., P• 217. 
CHAPTER V 
,HEGEL AND MARX: A COMPARISON 
When we examine the statement of Marx's contemporary and 
co-wri"ter Fredrich Engels about the "Revolution against Hegel" 
in ''The· End of Classical German Philosopi{y, ".we receive the 
impression that, although Hegel deserves a great deal of re-
spect for his treatment of major philosophical prob~ems, 
nevertheless, he was basically wrong. Just as Hegel synthe-
sized and transcended all previous philosophy, so Marx has 
synthesized and transcended Hegel, placing him in the category 
of useful but obsolete philosophers. We can see the respect 
accorded to Hegel, even in relation to later philosophers, in 
Engels~ comparison between Hegel and Feuerbach. 
We are again struck by Feuerbach's astonishing 
poverty when compared with Hegel. The latter's 
ethics, or doctrine of moral conduct, is the 
philoso~h~ of right, and embraces: (1) abstract 
right; l2J morality; (3) social ethics .••• under 
which again are comprised: the family, civil 
society, and the state. Here the content is as 
realistic as the form is idealistic. Besides 
morality, the whole sphere of law, economy, · 
politics is here included. With Feuerbach it 
is just the reverse: In form he is realistic, 
since he takes his start from man; but there is 
absolutely no mention of the world in which this 
man lives; heice th~s man remains always the same 
abstract man. 
1. Lewis S. Feuer (ed.), Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on 
Politics and Philosophy (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1959), 
p. 219. 
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Yet Engels claims that there is a basic contradiction in 
Hegel, and it is a contradiction which must be resolved. For 
the dialectic of Hegel asserts that nnothing is final, abso-
lute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of every-
thing and in everything; nothing can endure before it except 
the uninterrupted process of becoming and passing away, of 
endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher. 111 But while 
the dialectic proclaims the transitoriness of everything, "the 
whole dogmatic content of the Hegelian system is declared to 
be absolute truth, in contradiction to his dialectical method, 
which dissolves all dogmatism."2 Thus, the very content which 
Engels finds so realistic, he is forced to reject as dogmatic 
and as inconsistent with the 'spirit' of the dialectic. 
Our argument in this chapter will be first, that the de-
scriptions which Hegel and Marx give of existing institutions, 
such as civil society or the state, are similar descriptions. 
A great many of the insights of Marx are the insights of 
Hegel. Secondly, it will be shown that the abstract values 
which these men hold are also very much alike. By abstract 
values, we mean, in this context, such things as the value of 
love, or of emotional identity with an object, although the 
object of love, or the object with which we should emetionally 
identify ourselves has not yet been specified. Furthermore, 
1. ~., PP• 199-200. 
2. ~., p. 201. 
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it will be shown that, although these descriptions and values 
are the same, there is a difference, and the difference arises 
first of all in the type of unit in which each would like to 
see these values applied, and secondly, but more fundamentally, 
in different concepts of human nature; a difference which 
forces Hegel to accept existing institutions and, at the same 
time, forces Marx to reject them. Like two men who are in-
volved in a discussion of Mona~chy and Demoaracy, both are 
willing to admit that in a democracy ultimate authority must 
rest with the people while in a monarchy it must rest with the 
king. Furthermore, they are willing to accept the fact that a 
man ought to love that which allows him to fulfill his poten-
tial. But one says that the potential of man is to govern 
himself and therefore he ought to hate monarchy and love de-
mocracy, whereas the other man says that the potential of man 
is to function as a productive and useful member of a harmon-
ious and orderly society whose end is directed by a single in-
divis~ble authority and, therefore, he should love monarchy 
and hate democracy. Both to these men, and to Marx and Hegel, 
the fundamental difference lies in their different conceptions 
of human nature and this difference gives rise to different 
evaluations of the same institutions. For Hegel and Marx this 
difference also results in different conceptions of change, 
for Hegel will contend that an ethical society is not improved 
by violent internal upheaval, whereas Marx will contend that 
revolution is essential if the mistakes of the past are to be 
• 
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avoided. 
We begin our inquiry by examining Marx's contention that 
the state is not, as Hegel had claimed, the prime motivating 
force in directing the movement of its citizens, but rather, 
the real motivating force is civil society, or the economic 
relations existing betw·een men. .As Engels writes, "the will 
of the state is on the whole determined by the changing needs 
-of civil society. 111 Now, it is true that Hegel does not agree 
with this statement for, to Hegel, the will of the state does 
not fluctuate as rapidly as that of civil society. Neverthe-
less, it is well to remember that for Marx, too, the super-
structure is a conserving force. Yet, what Hegel does say is 
' that the population only realizes the importance of the state 
through their interaction with one another in civil society. 
Only by understanding the necessity of the corporation and the 
police for his own freedom, and only by understanding the neces-
sity of the state for the operation of the police and the cor-
poration does the citizen identify himself with the state. It 
' is certainly true that, for Hegel, this identification is 
understood to mean that the citizen will frequently forsake 
his own immediate interests for the interests of the state, 
but only because he understands that, in the long run, these 
interests are essential to his own. Of course, there is a 
difference and the difference is that, for Hegel, the state is 
1. Ibid., P• 235. 
-
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essential to civil society; without the state, the contradic-
tions inherent in civil society would rise to destroy that 
society. For Marx, the state is not at all esseatial for 
civil society. The economic relations between men, and the 
relation of a man to the means of production will still remain 
even though the state is destroyed. For Marx and Engels, the 
state is only necessary for the particular type of civil 
society which the capitalist demands, the kind which supports 
and maintains the division between owner and worker. As 
Engels again writes: 
The modern state • • • is only the organization 
that bourgeois society takes on in order to sup-
port the external conditions of the capitalist 
mode of production against the encroachment as 
well of the workers as of individual capitalists. 
The modern state, no matter what its form, is 
· essentially a capitalist machine.! 
Yet, again, as distant from Hegel as this sounds, there ~re 
still basic similarities. First of all, for Hegel, the type 
of civil society which the state maintains is the one of which 
Engels speaks. The state does preserve capitalism and, in 
this sense, it is an instrument of capitalism. Now, one of 
the differences between the two is that while, for Hegel, the 
state does preserve capitalism, it is not an instrument which 
belongs exclusively to the capitalist. Rather, the state is 
essential to the being of all, and in so far as it is essen-
tial to the being of all, it is not an instrument, but 
1. ~., p. 104. 
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something which is said to preserve and transcend its moments. 
But, even here, the difference is not quite so sharp as it may 
appear for Engels does admit that the state, especially, in 
its beginning stages, does establish a degree of order which 
moderates the conflict and is the condition £or later develop-
ment. As he writes in The Origins of The Family, Private 
Property, and The State: 
In order that these antaganisms, classes with con-
flicting economic interests, shall not consume 
themselves and society in a fruitless struggle, a 
power, apparently standing above society, has 
become necessary to moderate the conflict and keep 
it within the bounds of "order"; and this power, 
arises out of society, but placing itself above it 
and increasingly alienating itself from it, is the 
state.l 
Although.the state arises out of a need of all classes--the 
need to keep class antagonisms in check,'Engels believes that, 
as it develops, the state becomes an instrument of the ruling 
class. 
As the state arose from the need to keep class 
antagonisms in check, but also arose in the thick 
of the fight between the classes, it is normally 
the state of the most powerful, economically ruling 
class, which by its means becomes also the politi-
cally ruling class, and so acquires new means of2 holding down and exploiting the oppressed class. 
There is another difference however which is more fundamental. 
For Hegel, the state and the capital which it supports is the 
necessary condition whereby a citizen may express his talent 
and actualize his potential. For Marx and Engels these things 
1. in of The Famil Private Pro -
ork: International Publishers, 
2. ~., pp. 156-157. 
• are expressions of man's alienation. 
Thus, through alienated labor the worker 
creates the relation of another man, who does 
not work and is outside the work process, to 
this labor. The relation of worker to work 
also produces the relation of the capitalist 
• • • to work. Private property is therefore 
the product, the necessary result, of alienated 
labor, of the external relation of the worker 
to nature and to himself.l 
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As the pro¥ess develops, private property becomes· not only the 
result of alienated labor but "there is a reciprocal relation 
between the two." For Marx, the system of private property, 
and especially of money, prevents man from expressing what he 
really is. Marx decries this fact in his 'rEconomic and 
Political Manuscripts•· when he writes: 
The less you eat, drink, buy books, go to the 
theatre or to balls, or to the public house, 
and the less you think, love, theorize, sing, 
paint, fence, etc. the more you will be able 
to save and the greater will become. your 
treasure which neither moth nor rust will corrupt--
your capital. The less you are, the less you ex-
press your life, the more you have, the greater is 
your alienated life and the greater is the saving 
of your alienated being.2 
While Hegel ~elieves that the value of capitalism is that 
it allows individual talents to express themselves and that it 
provides meaningful work for poor, as well as rich, for worker 
as well as owner, Marx clai'ms that the only meaningful work is 
performed by the proletariat, while the only meaningful reward 
1. Erich Fromm (ed.), Marx's Concept of Man (New York: 
Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1961), pp. 105-106. 
2. ~·' p. 144. 
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is received by the owner. He writes in the ncritique of the 
Gotha Program" :that 
Any distribution whatever of the means of 
consumption is only a consequence of the con-
ditions of production themselves. The latter 
distribution, however, is a feature of the mode 
of production itself. The capitalist mode of 
production, for example, rests on the fact that 
the material conditions of production are in the 
hand of non-workers in the form of property in 
capital and land, while the masses are only 
owners of the personal condition of production, 
of labor power.l 
However, both the work and the reward have meaning only for 
alienated individuals, for individuals who are estranged from 
one another and from themselves. The capitalist denies the 
worker the value of his own creation and the assembly line 
denies the worker the value of creation itself. The capital-
ist, on the other hand, thinks that he is cultured for his 
money can buy art, he thinks that he is powerful for his money 
can buy opinions and he thinks that he is loved for his money 
can buy affection. But, says Marx: 
Let us assume man to be man, and his relation 
to the world to be a human one, then love can 
only be exchanged for love, trust for trust, etc. 
If you wish to enjoy art you must be an artis-
tically cultivated person; if you wish to influence 
other people you must be a person who has a stimu-
lating and encouraging effect upon others. Every 
one of your relations to man and to nature must be 
a specific expression, corresponding to the object 
of your will, of your real individual life. If 
you love without evoking love in return, i.e. if 
you are not able, by the manifestation ef yourself 
as a loving person, to make yourself a beloved 
1. Feuer, p. 120. 
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person, then your love is impotent and a misfortune. 1 
The difference here between Hegel and Marx is not in what they 
see but rather in h~w they see it. Both see a superstructure 
which is essential to the preservation of the substructure. 
Marx believes that the superstructure must be destroyed in 
order to effectively change the substructure. Hegel believes 
that the superstructure, which for him includes the sub-
structure (civil society as a part of the state), is worth 
preserving. 
The question is, why is their evaluation of the same situa-
tion so different? This question can only be answered in view 
of their different conceptions of the nature of man. For 
Hegel, men are born with different talents and abilities and 
the economic relations which exist are nothing but manifesta-
tions of this basic difference. The division of labor is not 
to be discouraged, for it is an expression of the many differ-
ences which are inherent in nature and which operate to form a 
unified and harmonious whole. The division of labor is the 
very fact which brings men into relationship with one another 
and it is one of the essential factors through which an in-
dividual becomes aware of himself as a part of a larger whole. 
I 
For Marx, the relationship is not that simple. In a sense the 
division of labor is natural as a necessary part of that mo-
ment of history which is composed of class societies, but it 
l. Fromm, p. 168. 
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is not an expression of man's highest nature. As a matter of 
fact, it hinders the development of that nature. A man does 
not join an assembly line because he wishes to fulfill his po-
tential, he joins because he is hungry and needs to fill his 
stomach. For Marx, the division of labor does not unite pri-
vate and public interests but rather it separates them. 
The division of labor implies the contradiction 
between the interest of the separate individual 
or the individual family and the communal interest 
of all individuals who have intercourse with one 
another •••• And finally, the division of labor 
offers us the first example of how, as long as man 
remains in natural society-- that is, as long as a 
cleavage exists between the particular and the 
common interest--as long, therefore as activity is 
not voluntary but naturally divided, man's own deed 
becomes an alien power opposed to him, which en-
slaves him instead of being controlled by him and 
from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a 
fisherman ••• while in communist society, where 
nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but 
each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, 
society regulates the general production and thus 
makes it possible for me to do one thing today and 
another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning and fish in 
the afternoon.l 
Certainly, Hegel would not question the fact that there is 
such a thing as a division of labor, nor would he question the 
assertion that a cleavage between the universal and the parti-
cular interest is an undesirable split, but he would question 
whether or not the division of labor is the cause of such a 
split. Hegel sees the division of labor as the first step in 
the uniting of men; for him, the division of labor brings men 
together in an interdependent relationship which leads the way 
1. Feuer, p. 254. 
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to the eventual union between universal and particular in-
terests. In a way, Marx, too, sees the division of labor as 
the first step in an eventual union, but it is a step which 
must be overthrown if the union is to take place. This type 
of first step is not what Hegel means. As he argues: 
When men are thus dependent on one another and 
reciprocally related to one another in their work 
and the satisfaction of their needs, subjective 
self-seeking turns into a contribution to the 
satisfaction of the needs of everyone else. That 
is to say, by a dialectical advance, subjective, 
self-seeking turns into the mediation of the 
particular through the universal, with the result 
that each man in earning, producing and enjoying 
on his own account is eo ipso producing and earning 
for the enjoyment of everyone else.l 
Furthermore, Hegel believes that, if this mutual need-satis-
faction and interdependence is to take place, it is necessary 
that a man concentrate on doing one task and doing it well. A 
man cannot hunt in the morning and fish in the afternoon while 
still contributing to the need-satisfaction of everyone else. 
Also, in contrast to Marx, Hegel does not look disparagingly 
upon the use of money in society. For, while money does not 
allow every individual to do whatever he wants when he wants, 
it does allow him to work at that for which his talent suits 
him and, at the same time, allows him to avoid being forced to 
perform services for the state which he has no ability or de-
sire to perform. 
Money is not one particular kind of wealth 
amongst others, but the universal form of all 
1. The Philosophy o.f Right, pp. 129-130. 
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types so far as they are expressed in an external em-
bodiment and so can be taken as 'things'. Only by being 
translated into these terms of the extreme culmination 
of externality can services exacted by the state be fixed 
quantitatively and so justly and equitably.! 
Yet, when we look more closely at the two views, we do 
find that the fundamental value judgements of these two men 
are quite similar, for both are advocating a concord between 
universal and particular interests. However, the units seen 
as universal (or communal) are different. Hegel understands 
the universal interests to be the interests of the state and 
the state is taken to include all the individuals and institu-
tions in it, with their past, their present and their future. 
This includes the institution of private o'rnership of the 
means of production. For Marx, the concord between particular 
and universal interests can never come about until the 
c:) 'contradiction' between social production and private owner-
ship of the means ~f ~reduction is overcome. The communal in-
terests, for Marx, are the interests of man and ~e does not 
0 
see these as limited by national boundaries. 
While we have mentioned that, for Hegel, the individual 
comes to identify himself with the state through his inter-
action with other individuals in civil society, we have failed 
to mention the mean~l' for Marx, by which the individual comes 
to understand his a~filiation with the communal interests. 
Again, there are many similarities with Hegel. For Marx, the 
initial recognition o£ this concord also comes in civil 
society, but it comes not through the identification of the 
individual with the corporation, but rather in his 
1. Ibid., pp. 194-195 • 
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identification with his class (the proletarist). Furthermore, 
just as Hegel found a great similarity between the identifica-
tion which the individual felt for the corporation and for the 
state, so there is a similiarity between the type of identifi-
cation felt by the worker towards his class, in Marx, and that 
felt by the citizen towards his state, in Hegel. As a matter 
of fact, both offer the same promises and demand the same sac-
' 
rifices. The promise is the promise of self-fulfillment, the 
sacrifice is the demands which the individual must accept in 
order to achieve this fulfillment, and these demands can mean 
something as valuable as his own life. There are still other 
similarities between these units. For example, the basic con-
flict, for Marx, is the conflict between classes, while, for 
Hegel, it is the conflict between states. Moreover, for both, 
these conflicts are the forces which move history forward. 
And again, while the goal of the individual, for Hegel, is to 
become conscious of oneself as a member of a state, the goal, 
for Marx, is to become conscious of oneself as a member of a 
class. 
If we examine the two justifications which Hegel gives for 
war, namely the development of spirit within the state and the 
movement of history which encompasses the state, we will find 
certain tenets which lend support to Marx's theory of classes. 
Eirst of 'all, the development of spirit means, for Hegel, the 
re-establishment of a tighter unity in the state. Long peri-
ods of peace tend to weaken the feeling of obligation which 
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men have towards their state and to. increase the purely self-
ish interests of the individual. Now, it is very likely that 
one could argue that the split which occurs in the state is a 
split between classes. The temporary decomposition of the 
state is a reversion to civil society and, of course, Marx 
would claim that civil society implies economic classes. Marx 
would want to argue that the fact that wars are necessary in 
order to hold the state together implies that the state is 
divided and, of course, the division for him is between those 
who are really members of the state-- the owners and those who 
are not-- the workers. Secondly, Marx does admit that the re-
lationship between states is ~ of the means by which history 
moves forward, for t~ese relationships (whether they be war ot 
the expansion of markets) are the means by which capitalism 
s~reads. As Marx and Engels write in The Manifesto: 
The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow 
to comprise the wealth created by them. And how 
does the bourgeoisie_get over these crises? On the 
one hand, by enforced destruction of a mass. of pro-
ductive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new 
markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of 
the old ones. That is to say, by paving the way for 
more destructive crises, and by diminishing the means 
whereby crises are prevented. 
If we examine these arguments, we find a number of striking 
things. First of all, Hegel claims that both owner and worker 
are members of the state, ,while Marx contends that the state 
is an instrument of the capitalist against the workers. Yet, 
Marx also admits that the state is a conserving force, and, as 
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a conserving force, it protects the capitalist's property from 
the proletariat. But how does it do this? The first and ob-
vious answer is that this is done through coercion, through 
the police, the law, and other institutions. But it is also 
, 
achieved through a certain degree of acceptance on the part of 
the worker towards these institutions. Now, whether this ac-
ceptance comes because the worker fears the police, or because 
through his requirement for material needs, he comes to accept 
the conditions of society, is of little consequence. The fact 
is that to some degree the worker does accept these institu-
tions. Furthermore, not until the revolution does he com-
pletely reject them (at least this is so if we are to judge 
what a man accepts and what he does not accept by how he 
acts). Now, Hegel might argue that the fact that, at any 
point in time, the worker does not try to overthrow the system 
means that, at least at that moment, there is a certain degree 
of acceptance. Certainly there are degrees of acceptance in 
both men. For Hegel, the philosopher is more consciously 
aware of his acceptance than is the average citizen and, for 
Marx, the action of the capitalist indicates a stronger desire 
to preserve the system than the desire which the worker feels. 
Yet, even the worker would accept the system quicker than he 
would accept starvation for, if he is given the limited and 
certainly unpleasant choice of starving or of going to work, 
he will, more than likely, accept the latter. Now, even 
though Marx does not believe that this is the only choice a 
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man has, for he feels that eventually the alternative will 
present itself whereby the system may be overthrown, there are 
still many similarities between the two men. For, we have 
shown that for both men the state exhibits the same kind of 
fluctuation (which Hegel called the unity and disunity of 
spirit). For, we have shown first that for both men there are 
degrees of acceptance, and secondly we have shown that for 
both the degree of acceptance of any one class may vary (for 
Marx the worker moves from meager acceptance of the state to 
complete rejection). To both Hegel and Marx, the state shows 
degrees of harmony and disharmony. Now, whether we want to say 
that the working class does not really belong to the state, as 
Marx does, or whether we prefer to say that all classes belong 
to it, as Hegel does, is re~lly inconsequential. The fact is 
that a clo~er approximation to unity, or harmony, or (in 
states where the choice for the worker is somewhat wider than 
work or starve) of just plain getting along, is achieved more 
easily in some periods than in others. Now, the difference 
between the two is in the amount of unity which they believe 
can be accomplished in the state. Marx thinks that very lit-
tle unity can be achieved, while Hegel feels a great deal can 
be achieved. And again, this difference arises out of their 
different views of human nature and from their different 
evaluations of the division of labor. For where Hegel be-
lieves that this division of labor unites men through inter-
dependence, Marx believes that, although it is the division of 
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labor which makes social production possible and, although it 
is social production, which is one of the conditions of union, 
the division of labor itself comes to restrict man, to enslave 
him and to alienate him. For Marx, the division of labor, and 
the state must eventually break down and pass over into 
communism. 
One of the main tenets of Marx's thought is the advocation 
of the elimination of private ownership of the means of pro-
duction. The explicit reason for this view is the feeling that 
the destruction of capitalism will end the division between 
classes and eliminate both exploiter and exploited. Yet, there 
are deeper reasons which look beyond Marx's stated division 
and attempts to see why he thinks of the worker as exploited. 
Marx feels that the very basic and fundamental value in 
society is the worker. All other value is created only when 
man mixes his labor w·i th the natural raw materials. ntabor is 
the- sole essence of wealth, 111 and "the wealth of labor, and 
industry is realized labor. 112 No"\v, for Marx, "Capital equals 
accumulated labor"3 and it "divides into interest and profit."3 
However, something has happened along the way for, whereas the 
laborer and his work is the source of capital, the interest 
and the profit which capital divides into (and which is really 
1. Fromm (ed.), p. 120. 
2. ~., p. 123. 
3. Ibid., p. 118. 
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the result of labor) belong not to their creator, not to the 
laborer, but rather to the capitalist. Now, the interesting 
fact is that Marx chooses to make a distinction ~etween what 
the capitalist does, and what the laborer does. Although the 
fact that he makes this distinction is not unusual, the prin-
ciple behind it is important. The distinction is based on the 
principle that the relationship of labor to prod~ction is a 
direct relationship, while the relation of the capitalist to 
production is less immediate and is based on the first. As 
Marx writes in the :•Economic and Philosophical Manuscript: v 
The direct relationship of labor to its products 
is the relationship of the worker to the ebjects of 
his production. The relationship of property owners 
to the objects of production and to production itself 
is merely a consequence of this first relationship 
and confirms it.l 
The worker is exploited because Marx sees him to be the source 
of wealth, but as the source of wealth, he does not reap the 
value of that which he creates. The laborer is the source of 
wealth because his relationship to the objects of production 
is direct. There is an opposition between capital and labor 
because the producer of capital, the laborer, does not enjoy 
the benefits which capital brings, thus, exploitation. 
Th~ distinction between capital and land, 
profit and ground rent, and the distinction of 
both from wages, industry, agriculture, im-
moveable and moveable private property, is a 
historical distinction, not one inscribed in 
the nature of things. It is a fixed stage in 
the formation and development of the antithesis 
1. ~., P• 98. 
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between capital and labor. 1 
If, as Marx believes, value is created only by the labor of 
the worker, and if one sees this labor as excluding the 
planning, the marketing, and the investment functions of the 
capitalist, then the logical conclusion is that the products 
of labor are being enjoyed by one who does not labor and that 
he who enjoys these products enjoys what really belongs to an-
other. In polite terms, this would be exploitation. As 
Engels writes in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific: 1' 
Thus the products now produced socially were not 
appropriated by those who had actually set in 
motion the means of production and actually pro-
duced the commodities, but by the capitalists. 
The means of production, and production itself, 
had become in essence socialized. But they were 
subjected to a form of appropriation which pre-. 
supposes the private production of individuals.~ 
The difference here is that Hegel is willing to accept in-
dividual capital as one essential p~erequisite for the crea-
tion of value. For Hegel, individual capital establishes 
individual initiative and individual initiative serves to in-
crease the public wealth. Marx believes that ultimately in-
dividual initiative and the subsequent increase in public 
wealth will not have to come through the desires of men to ag-
grandize at the expense of their fellow men. 
Both for Hegel and for Marx, the object of identification, 
the state er the class, is accepted by the subject only when 
1. ~., p. 113. 
2. Feuer, p. 94. 
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he becomes consciously aware of his essential relationship 
with these objects. The method by~hieh the individual be-
comes conscious of his relationship with these units again, 
offers ground for some comparison. The awareness begins for 
both the citizen and the worker in the economic relationship, 
or in civil society. For Hegel, the citizen's identification 
with the state comes through an extension of his identifica-
tion with the corporation (and ~t a smmpler stage, the fam-
, 
ily). For Marx, the identification of the worker with his 
class comes about through the increase in communication which 
the factory affords him. Here, the worker comes into contact 
with others of his kind and through this system they come to 
understand that their-plights are similar. The relationship 
of the worker to his fellow workers, for Marx, is in ma~ ways 
parallel to the relationship which Hegel finds between the re-
lationship of the individual to the family, the corporation, 
or the state. There is an ethical quality about all these re-
lationships. Certainly, the individual worker does unite with 
other workers for economic gain, but he also unites with them 
because he is able to feel compassion for them and to identify 
with them. This is nothing more than the feeling which Hegel 
described in his analysis of the family, the corpqration and 
the state. Yet, Hegel's analysis is a much easier one to ac-
cept, for the extension of feeling is a progressive type of 
development which has its seeds in the family and extends, 
with relatively little difficulty, through the corporation to 
0 
0 
0 
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the state. There are some difficulties with Hegel's discus-
sion (for example, how does the individual, in the midst of 
his self-seeking in civil society, and even in the corpora-
tion, become aware of himself as a part of a larger unit), but 
these problems are minor when compared to the problem of Marx. 
For Marx has assumed that the factory not only creates the 
conditions whereby the workers communicate with one another, 
' 
it also creates the conditions whereby the worker is dehuman-
ized. The labor which the worker performs is the labor of a 
beast, not of a man. The problem is to explain how this de-
humanized worker can come to identify, or to feel sympathy with 
anyone. Usually, a beast's worst enemy is another beast. 
Marx fails to explain this paradox, nor does history justify 
his predictions. Few of the more severe and permanent revolu-
tions have been worker's revolutions; Russia, China and Cuba 
were not great industrial powers when revolution took place. 
England, Germany, and The United States, once industry became 
established, never had an all-out worker's revolution, and the 
movement towards unionism was usually a cry for more comforts 
for· the working class, not an attempt to abolish the system 
which produced and worshipped these comforts. Subsequent his-
tory argues at least as much for Marx as it does against him. 
Nor is Marx's attempt in The Manifesto to explain the means 
whereby the worker becomes class conscious really successful. 
The communists are distinguished from the 
other working-class parties by this only: 1. In 
:bh·e- national struggles of the proletarians of 
di~ferent countries they point out and bring to the 
fTont the common interests of the entire proletariat, 
independent of all nationality. 2. In the various 
stages of development which the struggle of the work-
ing class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, 
theY, always and ever~-where represent the·interests of 
the movement as a whole.l 
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But Marx does not really tell us why there should be such men; 
he does not.say why certain men should see their o'vn interests 
to be the interests of the proletariat as a whole; he does not 
tell us why these men should not become the new exploiters, 
nor why their policies should not be surreptitiously designed 
to further their o'vn private interests in contrast to the real 
interests of the worker. In this respect, Marx fails to show 
completely what the forces are which will overthrow the tradi-
tions of capitalism. 
If Marx's notion of change does not completely explain the 
predictions which he makes, then it is plausible to argue that 
the prediction does not come from his notion of change, but 
rather that his notion of change comes from his desire to see 
-
capitalism overthrown. In essence, our argument is that Marx 
first rejects capitalism and then devises a notion of change 
to fit this rejection. His first rejection of capitalism is a 
moral objection; he rejects it because he sees it as a strug-
gle between oppressing and oppressed. Only after this moral 
rejection does he begin to project his hope that capitalism is 
only a passing phase of a total process on to history. 
1. ~., P• 20. 
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Hegel does not feel the moral repulsion which Marx feels. 
Hegel accepts the relation of men in civil society, not as a 
total process, but as a continuous moment in a higher syn-
thesis. But Marx does not think of the state as being higher 
than the individual. -Yet, when Marx says that he values the 
individual, he does not mean that he values him as he exists 
here and now, for the individual, as he exists here and now, 
is alienated and estranged. Marx values the individual as he 
is to be found in communism. Again, there is a powerful simi-
larity with Hegel. For both of them, man, as he is here and 
now, is only a moment in a total process and, as a moment, he 
is not (or not yet) of supreme value. For Marx, man's value 
becomes supreme only when the class division ends and com-
munism prevails. For Hegel, man realizes ~ supreme value 
only as a working member of an orderly state. Because Marx is 
unwilling to accept the state as the unit in which man 
achieves ultimate value, he is forced to devise a method of 
historical change which is radical and revolutionary and 
J 
abrupt. He must overcome the system that exists, he must 
overthrow the very foundation of present existence, the state, 
and then he must substitute communism. Hegel, on the other 
hand, prefers to accept the state, he prefers to work within 
the given system and to.improve it. For Hegel, the improve-
ment of the state means to accept its most essential goals and 
to actualize them. For Marx, the corruption in the state and 
in capitalism is inherent and the only way these institutions 
• 
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can improve is by working themselves out so completely that 
their total decadence and corruption will demand that they be 
overthrown. 
Thus, for Marx, the post-revolutionary institutions must 
be radically different from the prerevolutionary ones. The 
family, the class structure and other capitalist institutions 
must be destroyed. For Hegel, the feelings of an individual 
towards the family are extended to the corporation and then to 
.the state. However, while Marx denies that the concrete fam-
ily is an ethical relationship, he seems to be projecting the 
image which other theorists have given to the family on to 
society as a whole. He writes in The Manifesto that "The 
bourgeoisie has torn away from the family its sentimental veil 
and has reduced the family relation to a mere money relation."1 
Thus, where Hegel found that the family was tied together by 
subjective feelings of love and where he saw that the common 
property of the family expressed these feelings, Marx sees 
that the property of the family is somewhat less than common 
and it is property which places even the members of a family 
into an external relation with one another. Furthermore, 
while the relation between the individual and the state, for 
Hegel, seems to be an extension of the relation between the 
individual and the family, for Marx, too, communism is an ex-
tension of the family. But it is not an extension of the 
1. ~., p. 10. 
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family as Marx thinks the family is but, rather, it is an ex-
tension of the family as Hegel sees it, of the family as it 
claims to be, of the ideal family. Marx intends to restore 
this ideal of the family on a universal level. "In place of 
the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antago-
nosms, we shall have an association in which the free develop-
ment of e-ach is a condition for the free development of all."1 
For Maxx, the social relations which men enter are deter-
mined by the material mode of production and exist independ-
ently from the personal will. Marx writes that: 
In the social production which men carry on they 
enter into definite relations that are indispensable 
and independent of their will; these relations of 
production correspond to a definite stage of develop-
ment of their material powers o£ production. The sum 
total of these relations of production constitute the 
economic structure of society--the real foundation, 
on which rise legal and political superstructures and 
to which correspond definite forms of social con-
sciousness. The mode of production in material life 
determines the general character of the social, 
political, and spiritual processes of life. It is 
not the consciousness of men that determines their 
existence, but, on the contrary, their social exist-
ence determines their consciousness.2 
On the surface, this sound~ completely antithetical to Hegel, 
for Hegel believes that conscious activity directs all re-
lationships. Yet, this conscious activity, for Hegel, is not 
at all the conscious activity of an individual and, even here, 
the similarity between the two thinkers is more striking than 
1. ~., p. 29. 
2. ~., p. 43. 
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the differences. If we remember, for Hegel, a number of re-
lationships were present before the individual became aware of 
them, and that one of the essential characteristics of a per-
son was that he had the capacity to become aware of these re-
lationships and, perhaps, even to improve them. For example, 
the interdependency of men in civil society was present before 
the individual became aware of its presence; also, the neces-
l 
sity of the state for the indivi~ual and for the corporation 
was a necessity which existed long before either was aware of 
it. Thus, we might say that, for Hegel, also, these relation-
ships initially exist independently of the individual will (or 
at least independent of a conscious acceptance of them by a 
particular individual). Furthermore, these relations do de-
termine the individual consciousness for they set the limits 
of thought. Once the individual becomes consciously aware of 
his relation to the larger unit, it is necessary that he work 
for that unit. This is why Hegel sees so much value in the 
middle class, for they are more likely to see the necessity of 
the state to their own economic well-being. This is also why 
Marx is so antagonistic towards the bourgeoisie, because they 
are preservers of the state. Yet, when Hegel says that the 
state is necessary to the economic life of the individual, we 
might'object that, for Marx, the eonnamic life is necessary to 
I 
the state, but, again, the difference is not as great as it 
may seem. For, while Hegel does say ~hat the state is neces-
sary to the economic life, he is not speaking of a temporal 
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necessity, or of cause and effect. He is saying that the 
state maintains the order which the economic life requires for 
it to function properly. On the other hand, when Marx writes 
that the economic life is necessary to the state, he means a 
temporal type of necessity where one is related to the other 
as a•cause is related to an effect. Ultimately, for Marx, the 
economic relations determine the form which the political or-
ganization will take, and the determination is a temporal 
affair. Furthermore, Marx agrees with Hegel that, once the 
state is formed, it does establish the kind of order which 
tends to conserve the existing economic relations. Now, if 
Hegel realizes a temporal development from civil society to 
the state, then the parallel is complete. And the fact is 
that the state's development does depend upon the individual 
becoming aware of the necessity of the state to his own eco-
nomic well-being. Thus, there is a temporal development. The 
state is implicit in civil society, but its actualization and 
its development depends upon the development of civil society; 
the actual existence of the state comes ·after the development 
of civil society. Although Hegel's analysis begins with the 
'is thereness' of the state and then abstracts its elements 
from it as a logical development, this logical development al-
so describes a chronological development. This chronological 
development does not mean that society must always move from 
civil society to the state for the relationship could break 
down and a primitive emphasis on the family could reassert 
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itself. What it does mean is that the state, which is im-
plicit in both the family and in civil society, can explicate 
itself only after the development of civil society. Thus, 
like in Marx, the state develops after the development of the 
economic relations. 
In order for this development to come about, both Hegel 
and Marx deem it essential that someone be able to see the 
whole. For Hegel, the philosopher must be able to see the 
whole in order to conserve it; for Marx, the philosopher must 
be able to see the whole in order to change it. Furthermore, 
both men recognize that there are different levels of aware-
ness. For bqth, the philosopher has the highest degree of 
awareness of the entire society, but the middle class, for 
Hegel, and the proletariat, for Marx, also see the whole, but 
to a different degree. These two groups exhibit their aware-
ness of the entire society by their activity. For Hegel, the 
middle class is more aware of the state because, of all 
groups, they are the most instrumental in its preservation. 
For Marx, the proletariat exhibits its awareness of the con-
flict between exploiting and exploited because, of all groups, 
they are the most instrumental in changing it. Unlike the 
philosopher, the awareness of these groups is not an explic-
itly rational kind of awareness; it is less systematic and 
more active. The middle class, for Hegel, and the prole-
tariat, for Marx, are seen as the rational class because their 
activity is more strongly in accord with the movement of history 
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than any other class. 
Perhaps the most striking difference between Hegel and 
Marx is in their different evaluations of private property 
for, whereas Hegel accepts private property, Marx rejects it. 
But, even here, there are some points of similarity for, while 
Hegel does accept private property, in the state its importance 
becomes minimized. In The Philosophy of Right, he writes that 
War is the state of affairs which deals in 
earnest with the vanity of temporal goods and 
concerns--a vanity at other times a common 
theme of edifying sermonizing • • • • War has 
the higher significance that by its agency ••• 
'the ethical health of peoples is preserved in 
their indifference to the stabilization of finite 
institutions.•! 
Of course, one of the major differences here between Hegel and 
Marx is that Marx completely rejects the institution of private 
property, while Hegel accepts the institution, but rejects the 
importance of any particular individual's particular piece of 
property. 
1. The Philosophy of Right, p. 210. 
CHAPTER VI 
CRITICISM 
We have seen that private property is essential both in 
the development of »ersonality, and in the development of the 
state. First, ~rivate property br~ngs men into relationship 
with other men in contract, and secondly it establishes an in-
terdependence between men in civil society which leads to the 
c~rporation, and later to the state. But, in the state some-
thing happens to property, it becomes deemphasized. The dan-
ger of an elected monarchy, says Hegel, is "that the parti-
cular offices of state turn into private property, the 
sovereignty of the state is enfeebled and lost."1 And again, 
regarding war we have seen that Hegel believes that the value 
of war is that it turns the people away from finite and tem-
poral institutions, of which private property is one. 2 
Furthermore, we have seen that the same ethical identity (o~ 
feeling for the unit as a whole) which existed in the family 
now exists in the state and that in the family, property was 
not private, but common. Yet, while Hegel admits that private 
property does present the danger of a regression to civil 
society, he refuses to abandon the institution of private 
1. Philosophy of Right, p. 186. 
2. ~., p. 210. 
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preperty. He keeps the institution while minimizing the im-
portance of the claim of any particular individuals. But, if 
the institution of private property offers all these dangers, 
why is it necessary to keep it once we have passed to, the 
state? There are at least two answers which Hegel might give 
to this question. First, he might say that a state which does 
not allow private property limits subjective freedom. This 
argument is employed in his criticism of Plato where Hegel 
writes that in ~he Republic "the Guardians are left to allot 
individuals to their particular classes and impose on them 
their particular task. 111 Money frees the individual from this 
imposition and allews him to do what his desires dictate and 
what his talents allow. But here we must make a distinction, 
for a state may allow money without allowing private property 
in the traditional sense of the word. For example, a state 
might decide to issue equal portions of exchange value to its 
citizens allowing them to draw equally from the common capital. 
And, even though it might be objected that this would do an 
injustice to the idea that rewards ought to be granted in pro-
portion to duties, one might remark that such distribution on 
the part of the state is little different than the distribu- . 
tion which actually takes place in the family where reward is 
based more on need than on duty. We must conclude that, as 
far as Hegel's argument goes, there is no reason why an equal 
1. ~., P• 195. 
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amount of a common means of exchange could not proyide the 
subjective freedom by which Hegel justifies private property. 
As a matter of fact, sometimes private property can enslave 
someone to an unwanted occupation as efficiently as the most 
forceful of states. For while it is true that an individual 
may remove his will from anything whatsoever, it is also true 
that if his livelihood depends on that thing, then this is a 
very difficult and dangerous thing to do. Furthermore, we 
might also note that there is a most important change in 
Hegel's idea of capital as this idea first appears in the fam-
ily, and then in civil society._ For, in the family, capital 
is only common, while in civil society, there are two kinds of 
capital, one common, the other private. Certainly, in civil 
society, there are reasons for this division, but one would 
think that the state would resolve this difference. Further-
more, one would also think that, if the state did resolve the 
difference, it would do so more along the lines of the family 
which, like itself, is an ethical unit, rather than along the 
lines of civil society which is the division of the ethical 
idea. But the state does not resolve this difficulty, it 
maintains the split which is found in civil society. However, 
there is another argument which Hegel uses for maintaining the 
institution of private property an4 this argument rests on the 
need for individual ·initiative. The argument is that, without 
an object of immediate concern, the individual becomes lazy 
and rebellious. Private property, it is said, provides such 
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aD object. It allows men to satisfy their own needs while al-
so satisfying the needs of everyone else. As Hegel writes of 
the corporation: 
Hence a selfish purpose, directed towards its 
particular self-interest, apprehends and 1 evinces itself at the same time as universal. 
But, we must remember, that for Hegel, the state, like the 
family, is an ethical institution whose members have an iden-
tification with it. Furthermore, in the family, there was no 
mention of private property, the property of the family was 
common, and this common property was not seen to be an invita-
tion to laziness. The question we must ask then is, if the 
state, like the family, is an ethical organization, why is 
private property necessary? 
One answer to this question which we might give concerns 
the very nature of Hegel's analysis. For we have suggested a 
number of times that the movement which Hegel describes in ~ 
Philosophy of Right is.not to be taken strictly as a histori-
cal movement, but more as an examination of what does exist. 
This does not mean that the family does not precede the por-
poration, or that the corporation may not precede the state, 
but what it does mean is that these institutions are to be 
seen as parts of the state, parts which in isolation, exhibit 
an incompleteness when seen in the context of the actually 
given system. Thus, for example, the corporation passes on to 
1. Ibid., p. 152 • 
........... 
• 
• 
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the state because, in fact, the corporation is limited by 
something other than itself, by the public authority. The 
family passes on to civil society because there is actually 
something more than an inaividual family, and the first thing 
which presents itself is another family. But, there is no 
necessary reason why the family should actually go through the 
movement of civil society. This is one among many possible 
movements. There are enough primitive tribes which have never 
developed corporate structures to show that this movement need 
not take place~ The fact is, that Hegel begins with the family 
which has moved through civil society and entered the state. 
He begins with the state and then he investigates everything 
that is a part of it. Thus, the family must pass to the state 
because all families which belong to a state have. The family 
with which Hegel begins winds up in the state because that is 
where it began in the first place. Perhaps this is even more 
emphatic when it comes to the corporation, for in the strict 
sense of the word, a corporation usually must have the sanc-
tion of a larger body, normally a state. Thus, the corpora-
tion does not arise before the state; it is a part of the 
state, and when seen as isolated from the state, of course, it 
must be completed. The fact is that Hegel begins with what he 
wants to prove. He begins with the state and when he does 
isolate something from the state, for the purpose of analysis, 
it is already det~rmined that this something will end up as a 
part of a state because that is where the analysis began. If 
• 
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we had begun our analysis with a primitive tribe, then every-
thing which we separated from that tribe would eventually wind 
up back in it, and the tribe would be seen to be the infinite 
(in the sense of the whole, or a unity). If we had begun with 
the notion of world history as Hegel does in The Philosophy of 
History, then every particular s~a~e would eventually find its 
place in the movement of history as a whole, and history would 
turn out to be infinite with each state as only a passing 
phase. Thus, where Hegel starts with the state in The Phi-
losophy of Right, he is bound to accept property as a part of 
the state, but one is never quite sure where it fits. 
For these same reasons, Hegel can never really question 
what he does begin with, he can nev.ex really question the 
value of the state. Yet, even in his view of the state, there 
are certain unresolved tensions~ In Hegel's discussion of 
sovereignty in ~he Philosophy o£ Right he asserts that: "every 
state is sovereign and autonomous against its neighbors. 111 
The only stipulation which is made here is that the constitu-
tion of the state determines whether its claim to statehood is 
really valid or not. He then goes on to say, that 11 since the 
sovereignty of a state is the principle of its relations to 
others, states are to that extent in a state of nature in re-
lation to each other. 112 This we can only take to mean that a 
I 
1. ~., P• 212. 
2. ~., p. 213. 
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state is independent with respect to another state. Now, in 
his discussion of sov.ereignty in The Philesophy of Right,Hegel 
mentions nothing of the size, or the importance of the state. 
But in The Philosophy of History, he wri~es: 
Minor states have their existence arid t~anquility 
secured to them more or less by their neighbors: 
they are therefore, properly speaking, not in-
dependent, and have not the fiery trial of war to 
endure.l 
Hegel does not say what he means by a minor state, but there 
is no reason to believe that this refers to a state whose con-
stitution is not orderly. More than likely he means states 
which do not have the power to defend themselves. Yet, we 
must ask, defend themselves against what? against one other 
state, against two other states, against all other states? 
Or, perhaps he means exactly what he says, perhaps he means 
that a minor state is one which loeks for protection from its 
neighbors. But then, how many neighbors are needed to protect 
· a minor state? One, two, an entire alliance? The only con-
clusion we can arrive at is that the designation of a minor 
state depends upon whe is threatening it and who is protecting 
it. Perhaps even the strongest state could not survive an at-
tack from all the others. This being so, then perhaps inde-
pendence, and maybe even sovereignty itself is a relative, not 
an absolute quality of a state. In The Philosophy of Right, 
Hegel says that: 
1. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, p. 456. 
Sovereignty depends on the fact that the particular 
functions and powers of the state are not self-
subsistent or firmly grounded either on their own 
account or in the particular will af the individual 
functionaries, but have their roots ultimately in 
the unity of the state as their single self.l 
Again he writes that: 
The ~dealism which constitutes sovereignty is the 
same characteristic as that in accordance with 
which the so-called 'parts• of an animal organism 
are not parts but members, moments in an organic 
whole, whose isolation and independence spell 
disease.2 
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This sovereignty finds its completion in the monarc~ who gives 
form to the people. But now, if sovereignty means a society 
in which the parts are unified under a certain form and where 
the isolation of the part spells disease for the whole, then 
it would seem that the sovereignty of a state is dependent 
u~on the activity of other states and, if this is so, then no 
state would ever be completely sovereign. War, whether it af-
fects the other state positively or negatively, is not the 
only situation in which one state affects the unity of an-
other. Hegel writes of civil society (which, we must remem-
ber, is as much a member of a state as the parts of an animal 
are members of the organic whole), that as it grows, it tends 
nto push beyond its own limits and seek markets, and so its 
necessary means of subsistence, in other lands which are 
either deficient in the goods it has overproduced, or else 
1. The Philosophy of Right, pp. 179-180. 
2. ~., p. 180. 
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generally backward in industry."1 Now, if we remember that 
civil society is a member of the state, we must admit that 
anything which affects civil society will also affect the 
state, and also any state whose unity is affected by another 
is limited in its sovereignty. Economics is an area in which 
the unity of one state is strongly influenced by the activity 
of another. A severe depression in one state many times has 
its effect on other states; the advancement of an economically 
backward nation to a position where it can compete with other 
states should cause some change in the policy of a more ad-
vanced state if it is to retain its own unity. The truth that 
Hegel fails to perceive is that nat only are minor states not 
independent, but that every state is to some degree dependent 
upon the others. There is as much unrecognized interdependence 
I 
between states as there was between men in civil society. 
While in The Philosophy of Right, he fails to give due recogni-
tion to the fact of relative autonomy, or interdependence. :~.!n '', 
The Philosophy of History~ ,Me gives this recognition only to 
minor states, and here what is recognized is not interdepend-
ence, but dependence. 
l. Ibid., p. 183. 
0 
SUPPLEMENT 
Although our study has dealt primarily,with the concept of 
property as revealed in The Philosophy of Right, there is in 
Hegel's early philosophy, The Jenenser Realphilosophie, some 
discussion of this concept which serves to supplement parts of 
The Philosophy of Right. 
In The Realphilosophie, Hegel distinguishes between being 
and being-for-itself. Being-for-itself is the I which is its 
own object. But, at first, this I is only potential being-for-
itself. In order to actualize this potential, it must univer-
salize itself, that is, it must first see itself as a process 
which exists at more than one particular moment; its immediacy 
must. be recognized as a part of a total movement and, in this 
movement, the individual must recognize the species character-
istics of his own existenQe, he must recognize that he is a 
man among men. The first step in becoming being for itself is 
ulanguage as the capacity to name."1 Through language, man is 
able to posit the universal as having being and through the 
name, spirit creates the object; it creates the universal. 
The name and the species which the name names are the creation 
of spirit, of the namer, and this creation is different than 
1. 
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mere sensation. As Hegel writes: "In so far as we see or feel 
or hear, we are the thing itself, unmediatedly one with it and 
fulfilled in it. Stepping back, however, and considering it 
as a name, it is spiritually something. entirely d~fferent." 1 
Only in naming do the immediate sensations of seeing, hearing, 
feeling achieve their truth. Only with names can concepts be 
formed which relate the immediate sensations ~o one another. 
With the name, the object can be absent, and still be conceived 
as an object. The name (Hegel) sometimes refers to it as the 
sign) is the first thing that has a significance other than 
what it is in itself. In itself, the sign is merely an aud-
ible series of tones, but its significance is not in the tone, 
but in what the tone represents. 
Now, when this universality, which achieved its being 
through the name, is presented to the will, it is goal. The 
goal stands separated from the changes and the flux of in-
dividual activity. But when this ~ctivity decides to direct 
itself towards a goal, then the two become mediated by drive. 
Drive is activity, but it is not in unsteady flux, it is ac-
tivity which is directed towards a goal. Without individual 
activity, the goal is empty and without the goal, the in-
dividual activity is pure motion. The drive is satisfied 
through the finished work of the individual. 
In satisfying a drive, man creates tools, or tills the 
1. ~., pp. 183-184. 
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soil and in so doing he possesses not merely a particular ob-
ject, such as this particular piece of bread, he possesses·the 
general means for making bread, for satisfying desires. This 
general means remains even after a particular desire is satis-
fied. But the means of satisfaction, the tool or the produc-
tive soil is not active, it is an inert thing. The individual 
\ 
has to work with it. "The .! remains the soul of this process 
in relation to it, it is the activity."1 'rhen original ac-
tivity is put in the thing, such as placing the wheel in water 
to create energy which is organized and directed, then the 
11 blind doingu of nature "is made purposive. 112 It is made into 
something which it originally is not. Here the cunning of the 
individual takes over and directs the power of nature. Cun-
ning changes nature from haphazard movement to purposive 
activity. 
Cunning seeks to control power and this control is effeG-
tive only when knowledge is present. Thus, in this search for 
control of power, cunning becomes "The non-knowing drive to 
knowledge." 3 With cunning, the will has become determined. 
It directs itself towards the goal of controlling nature, and 
this determined will is called by Hegel 'character'. The 
knowledge which is sought demands reflection. The drive must 
1. ~., P• 198. 
2. _ill!., P• 198. 
3. ~., P• 198. 
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reflect back upon itself, it must appraise its successes and 
its failures and "when the drive reflects upon itself, or is 
turned back upon itself, it has become knowledge just as much 
as it is a drive. 111 But knowing is the type of thing which 
knows universals and if it is to truly reflect upon itself, it 
must come to know itself. This can only be done through an-
other individual. But this other being-for-itself is also a 
being-for-me and-1a being-for-it. It is .the type of being 
which can know itself in me. This, Hegel calls 'love'. 
This movement of having one's essence in another is found 
in the family. Unlike the relationship which existed with the 
tool, here both extremes are self-conscious activity. Here, 
we have completely free individuals who exist for each other. 
But the family is exclusive, that is it excludes all those who 
are not members. 
It is this relation which is generally taken to 
be the state of nature: the free indifferent 
being of individuals with respect to one another. 
And the right of nature should account for what 
rights and duties these individuals have with 2 
respect to each other in terms of this relation. 
But the fact is that, in this relation, there are no rights 
and there are no duties. Rights and duties are only attained 
by transcending this stage. In the state of nature, the in-
dividual posits himself as a free self-consciousness, but this 
is only a posit, it is not yet actual. Here, he is limited by 
1. ~., p. 199. 
2. Ibid., pp. 204-205. 
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every other free self-consciousness. Through the perception 
of this fact, and by his own activity, the individual is 
raised out of this state of nature. 
The person is necessarily perceived and is necessarily 
percipient. This necessity is his own, not that of 
our thinking in opposition to the content. As per-
cipient he is himself activity, and' it is this activity 
that raises him out of the state of na~ure.I 
Even in ths state of nature, the individual is in relation 
with other individuals and it is by recognizing this relation 
that they are eventually raised out of the state of nature. 
The individuals do not yet recognize how they are 
in relation to one another unless their being is 
much more disturbed.2 
This disturbance comes about in possession. 
Possession is exercised over things but it "also has the 
significance of excluding a third party. 113 But as of now 
there is no right of possession. "The achievement of pos-
session is the empirical capacity and it is only through re-
cognition or perception that it becomes a matter of right."4 
Right and property arise only when recognition takes place. 
However, in this fixst act of possession, the individual is 
unmediated, he does not hold his possession through exchange 
or contract. The question to be asked then is what can we 
really possess in such a case? What can really be called 
1. 
.!2.!.9.·, p. 206 • 
2. ~., P• 206. 
3. ~., p. 207. 
4. Ibid., P• 207. 
-
mine? Hegel answers: 
a) my body; b) that which I already have in my mouth 
or in my hand, but not this alone; also what I mark 
with my desire or with my eye, what I, already would 
have, or would strive to get. Children have a right 
to something because they are the first to see it or 
to have wanted it. Adults achieve this if they can 
do no more than to get there before someone else.l 
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But still recognition is needed in order to secure this 
possession. Either recognition comes through love, as in the 
family where the two wills stand together without opposition, 
or it comes through the exclusion of, the opposition to, and 
the conflict with another will. The possession by one member 
of a family does not exclude possession of that same object by 
another member, but he whose being is found outside of the 
family is excluded. This excluded being does not immediately 
grant recognition to the other for, at first, it violates the 
possession of the other, and in so doing 11it posits • • • its 
excluded being-for-itself, its ~."2 It intends to assert 
itself as an unlimited free being in its O\VD right. However, 
"It comes to the awareness that it is going something dif-
ferent than what it means to do. Its intention was the pure 
relation of its being to itself, its unlimited being-for-
itself."3 The result, however, is that both beings now stand 
over and limit one another. Nor does this relationship result 
1. ~., p. 208. 
2. ~., p. 210. 
3. Ibid., p. 210. 
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in the equality of the two beings but rather in a new in-
equality. 
Equality demands that both should posit themselves 
in the thing. But here is the higher inequality 
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of the positing of the one in the other. The first 
posits himself in the undominated thing while ·the 
second posits himself in that which has been occupied. 
This inequality is to be transcended.! 
The violator has subsumed not only the object, as the 
first had done, but also he has limited the activity of the 
first. The first has lost the object, while the second has 
obtained it. But, while the second is satisfied with his ac-
complishment, the satisfaction is not in what he is, but 
~ather in what he has done. For he is not yet a free being, 
he is still conditioned by the other. All that has occurred 
is that the roles have been reversed. 
In the struggle of possession, the violator has come to 
knowledge of himself, he has come to recognize himself as a 
being-for-itself. But he whose possession has been violated 
also strives to gain this recognition. This impli~it recog-
nition comes about when he realizes that his being has in-
voluntarily been subsumed by an alien-being. With this 
necognition of involuntary subsumption comes the correspond-
ing recognition that he is something which is implicitly free. 
But, in order for this recognition of freedom to achieve 
actuality, it must be also recognized by the other. But the 
other, if he is to recognize him, must see him not mer·ely as 
1. ~·, p. 210. 
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thing, but as a will. However, the will is indifferent to any 
particular possession and, therefore, if this recognition is 
to come about, it must not be based on any particular posses-
sion , but rather on a "conscious being for itself which 
has the pure significance of knowledge for itself."1 
This knowing will is now the general. It is the 
being-recognized. Setting itself against itself 
in the form of universality it is being, actuality. 
And the person is that subject which has the in-
dividual as its object. The will of the individual 
is the universal and the universal is thus in-
dividuated. In its generalized form, this is 
morality, in its unmediated form, however, this is 
right.2 
• • • 
At this point, possession is transformed into right. Here 
"what was the good of the family becomes a general product and 
satisfaction for all, and the difference between individuals 
becomes a knowledge of good and evil, personal justice and in-
justice. tt 3 This phas'e of spirit Hegel calls practical spirit. 
Here, the needs of the individual become the means whereby he 
is related to other individuals, and it becomes the means of 
being recognized. 
Previously, the needs of the family were satisfied by the 
family itself and the other being was excluded. Here, need is 
satisfied by the abstract work of many individuals. The 
finished product involves the work of many men and the product 
1. Ibid., P• 211. 
2 • 
.!2!!!.·' P• 212. 
3 • 
.!.!.!!·' p. 213. 
e 
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which is made goes beyond the needs of any one individual. 
Yet, while the possession of the individual exists also for 
others--as the goods produced by the labor of his body--his 
work is abstract; it is only a small part of a total process. 
His work itself becomes entirely mechanical, or, is 
characterized by a simple determination. But the 
more abstract it becomes, the more it is only abstract 
activity and thereby he is ,in a position to take him-
self out of his work and to substitute the work of 
external nature in place of his activity.l 
Money becomes the means whereby this process of work actu-
ally comes to exist for another and again, money is the means 
by which the universality of work is realized. "Its universa-
lity, to which it aspires, is the equality (of all these ab-
stractions), or value. In value, they are all the same. This 
value itself, as a thing, is money."2 With money and exchange 
comes recognition and property. "Each one sustains the pos-
session of the other. 113 One person consents to give up his 
goods because another person makes the same concession. ~hus, 
recognition is granted and possession is transformed into 
property. 
1. 
.!!U:!·, P• 214 • 
2. Ibid., P• 215. 
-
3. Ibid., P• 216. 
-
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ABSTRACT 
Chapters II through IV of our inquiry are concerned with 
exposition and interpretation. In Chapter II, we examine the 
meaning and the development of property from its beginning in 
possession to its completion in contract. Here we find that 
the will exhibits a universality which is not found in things. 
The will is able to place itself in anyone of an infinite num-
ber of things and in doing so, the will takes possession of 
that thing. But possession is not the same as property, for 
the fact that a person has a right over things is not yet re-
cognized by others, and every person ~ho does not recognize 
this right, is.a threat to our possession. Only through 
struggle and cunning is the individual able to maintain his 
occupancy over the thing and the result of this struggle is an 
implicit recognition of the right of others to own property. 
However·, this recognition is only implicit. At this point the 
truce which has been achieved is only a tentative truce. Re-
cognition, and therefore property, becomes explicit only in 
contract. Contract is possible because man's will is uni-
versal, because he is able to alienate any particular piece of 
property and because one of the means of alienating property 
is through exchange. In contract we are no longer taking pos-
session of a mere thing, we are now taking possession of a 
thing into which someone,had previously placed his will and 
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now has consented to remove it. We are granting explicit re-
cognition to his right over things, just as he is granting 
this same recognition to us. In contract, the universality of 
the will is also recognized, but the contract is only the re-
sult of two immediate wills, thus, while it claims for itself 
universal validity, it fails to provide the conditions whereby 
this universality may be realized. Nor may contract claim 
that it is based on reason, for reason is universally valid, 
while contract has its validity only ~etween particular wills. 
Because of this lack, contract contains within itself the 
seeds of wrong. Crime is a coercive wrong act which threatens 
to annul the universality of my will by negating my right over 
a thing. But punishment also is an act of coercion, but it is 
an act which seeks to annul the crime and which attempts to 
restore the universal. At this point, two things have oc-
curred: first, we are no longer judging an !£! merely by its 
results, but also by its intent {punishment and crime are both 
acts of coercion, but the first intends to violate right, 
while the second intends to restore it); secondly, the demand 
arises for an impartial authority who is -able to judge intent. 
But, at this point, no such authority exists. 
At this point, we turn to an examination of the will 
turned inward, to an examination of intent. This we find in 
Chapter III and its discussion of morality. Here; the person 
identifies his subjective will with the universal will. Here, 
we find the demand is for welfare and for the good. However, 
• 
• 
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at this stage, the individual is only aware ef the fact that 
this unity between his subjective will and the universal will 
exists, he is not yet aware of what this unity consists. 
Thus, the good which is demanded is a subjective good, it, 
too, lacks universal validity. This type of good destroys the 
distinction between good and evil and it reduces ethics to re-
lativism. The tensions found. in morality between willing the 
good and doing the gooa,. between universal and particular must 
be overcome, but once they are overcome we are no longer in 
the area of morality, but in the ethical life. 
Chapter IV deals with the ethical life and with the role 
which property plays in the various institutions of this life. 
Here, we examine the actual standards which are found in such 
institutions as the family, civil society and the state. We 
find that the first institution of the ethical life is the 
family. Here, each member works for the benefit of the others 
and the family property is used for the benefit of all. This 
use of property for a specific purpose is the first form of 
capital. Part of the function of the family capital is to 
educate the children so that they may eventually form families 
of their own. Thus, there arises a plurality of families 
where the existence of one limits the freedom of another. 
This plurality of families is what Hegel calls 'civil society'. 
. ( 
The members of civil society are related to each other only 
through economic necessity and not through subjective feeling 
as was the case in the family. However, this economic 
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necessity is important in establishing the interrelation be-
tween people which is to give rise to the subjective feeling 
which,:l~ter,will be found in the state. Thus, we find that 
both private property and capital are essential in the de-
velopment from civil society to the state. As civil society 
develops, the necessity of one member to another is realized 
and corporations are formed which accent this necessity. The 
members of the corporation are united not only through eco-
nomic necessity, but also through subjective feeling. How-
ever, the corporation depends for its existence upon institu-
tions which are not a part of itself and, as such, the 
corporation is limited in the same way as the family was 
limited in civil society. The state is the fulfillment of all 
these moments. In it the family and the corporation find both 
their freedom and their reality. Their freedom, because only 
through the order created by the state can these units operate 
effectively; their reality, because only in so far as they can 
operate effectively are they able to actualize their potential, 
or to a~hieve their purpose. The state, then, is seen by 
Hegel to be a completely autonomous and sovereign ethical unit 
and,. as such, its relation to ether states is determined 
solely by itself. History is the only judge which stands 
above the state. 
In Chapter V, we draw some comparisons between the phi-
losophy of Hegel and the philosophy of~Karl Marx. In this 
chapter we argue that there are a great number of similarities 
0 
0 
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both in the way these men picture many of the same institu-
tions and in many of the abstract values which they hold. 
However, the differences arise first from the different in-
stitutions in which they would like to see these values ap-
plied and secondly in the different concepts of human nature 
which these men hold. 
Chapter VI contains our criticism of Hegel in which we 
argue that his justification for private property in the state 
is inadequate in light of the similarity between the family 
and the state which he points out. Furthermore, we show that, 
by the very nature of Hegel's analysis, he is unable to ques-
tion the value of the state and, also, that he fails to give 
due consideration to the interdependence between states. 
